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ABSTRACT
INQUIRY AND PROVOCATION: THE USE OF AMBIGUITY
IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH POLITICAL SATIRE

Jason J. Zirbel, MA
Marquette University, 2020

Nearly all literary theories for a millennium have defined satire according to its
linguistic clarity and moral certainty. Not until recently have theorists such as Dustin
Griffin recognized that satire often comprises an ambiguity that moves it beyond the
mere policing of established moral boundaries. This project considers how four sixteenthcentury satirists—Thomas Wyatt, George Gascoigne, Thomas Deloney, and Thomas
Nashe—exploited satire’s capacity for open-ended inquiry to address the rapid political
and economic changes that typified the early modern period. Rather than relying on
established moral codes to domesticate uncertainty, these writers used satire to explore
and analyze government bureaucratization, the nature of commonwealth, the generation
of Crown revenue through the granting of monopolies, and the transition from a
patronage to a market economy. Satire’s often overlooked ambiguity allowed these
writers to engage these political and economic issues in ways beyond the dogmatic and
tentatively to posit responses to contingencies at a time when received wisdom proved
inadequate. The conclusion of my project is two-fold: Historically, it reveals English
satire of the period to be of a greater complexity and nuance than hereto recognized,
attributes ideally suited to the political and economic flux of early modern England.
Generically, it highlights the functional and constructive ambiguity of a literary mode too
often seen, even by modern theorists, as clear-cut in its moral underpinnings and
disruptive in its methods.
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Introduction

Nearly all theories of satire for a millennium have defined the satiric mode
according to its clarity and certainty, whether of expression or of morality. However, the
works of Thomas Wyatt, George Gascoigne, Thomas Deloney, and Thomas Nashe
suggest a trend, as yet inadequately treated, among satirists toward utilizing ambiguity—
with all its iterations: lack of closure, doubleness, porosity—to probe unprecedented
events and tentatively suggest suitable responses. Beyond a degree of plausible
deniability, the ambiguity of satire allowed writers during the sixteenth century to
confront their political and economic situations in ways beyond the dogmatic and
moralizing, to posit pragmatic responses to contingencies at a time when received
wisdom fell short.
As such, these satirists can be read as part of a larger overall trend within
European writing during the sixteenth century. The “typical humanist historian” cited by
George Rowe “analyzed the past [or the present] to make it conform to eternal truths
which had already been recognized,” regarding the past in a way that “did not discover or
create new truths… [but rather] confirmed old ones.”1 But an epistemological shift during
the sixteenth century, spearheaded by a new generation of historians— Guicciardini,
Stow, Bodin, Camden, Selden,—challenged this humanist model with a more empirically
minded historiography in which “meaning [gave] way to fact.”2 Rather than “domesticating the new and unfamiliar”3 by reading past and current events according to a priori
truths, this new historiography pursued a more pragmatic analysis of causes and events.
Similarly, in Logic and Rhetoric in England, W.S. Howell argues that advances in
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modern epistemology and natural science propelled rhetoric from “communication of
what we already know” to a mission of “inquiry.” Rather than seeking to recover a
“storehouse of ancient wisdom,” rhetorical invention aimed at “discovering what [had
been] hitherto unknown.”4 Finally, the work of Neal Wood details a related development
in English political writing throughout the sixteenth century. As the early modern state
emerged from the feudal kingdom, a combination of classical models and empiricism
resulted in a pragmatism not seen in the political scholasticism of medieval writers, “an
acute sensitivity to the correction of social and economic ills by rational public policy
[rather] than by high-level theorizing and the quest for first principles.”5
Critics have long acknowledged satire’s topicality. Its exigence is immediate and
extraliterary, steered by a topicality that oftentimes evokes backlash in contemporaries
and bewilderment in readers at a remove from the circumstances by which it is
occasioned. Hallet Smith perhaps put it most clearly, writing that
The significant sources of satire are not literary or philosophical: they are
social and economic. For the understanding of satire, and the response to
it, we need not so much an acquaintance with models and conventions, or
an understanding of ideas and principles, as a knowledge of the social
milieu from which the satire sprang.6
My concern is largely with how English satirists responded to the “bureaucratic
innovation”7 of the Tudor dynasty, which was itself part of the emergence of the early
modern state. The satires I treat here all reflect in some degree the work of contemporary
political writers such as Edmund Dudley, Thomas Starkey, Thomas Smith, and the
Commonwealthmen who, whatever their ideological differences, contributed to an
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emerging analytical movement to comprehend the changing nature of commonwealth
with a realism that incorporated, but was not limited to, Christian ethics. Like political
writers during the sixteenth century, these satirists are concerned with social analysis,
causality, and questions of policy; they perceive, in Keith Wrightson’s words,
“sometimes sharply, sometimes dimly and uncertainly, the erosion of an older economic”
and, I argue, political order “and the animation of a new.”8 Wyatt, Gascoigne, Deloney,
and Nashe show how satire’s capacity for ambiguity is (perhaps) uniquely suited for
negotiating the dire straits between increasing awareness of a “highly differentiated and
economic and social structure” and a “harmonious Christian social order dated back to
the early middle ages.”9
Central to my argument is Dustin Griffin’s reformulation of satire, which
highlights the mode’s capacity for inquiry and provocation. Griffin’s work is a response
to theorists who contend that the satirist is certain of a moral standard, that complexity
has no place in satire. Griffin rightly asks, if this is the case, how does such moralizing
manage to engage mature readers? His answer is that the bipolar praise/blame structure is
the "satirist's point of departure rather than the destination.... [W]e are asked to hold in
mind two conflicting thoughts."10 In support of this view, Griffin cites the sermons, “little
chats,” of both Lucilius and Horace; the Menippean tradition; and satiric discursive terms
such as “lanx satura, sermo, farrago, dialogue, essay, anatomy”11 that suggest satire’s
potential for open-ended inquiry. Griffin’s work is key to considering how satirists move
beyond the strictly moral/critical, to posit new alternatives, rather than merely falling
back upon established moral norms. Considering Tudor satire in this light shows two
things: Historically, it reveals English satire of the period to be of a greater complexity
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and nuance than hereto recognized, attributes ideally suited to the political and economic
flux of early modern England. Generically, it highlights the functional and constructive
ambiguity of a literary mode too often seen, even by modern theorists, as clear-cut in its
moral underpinnings and disruptive in its methods.
An overview of the critical literature reveals how theories of satire from the
medieval to the modern period have been unduly restrictive, too often limiting satire to a
didactic function and moral certainty. The body of my dissertation will then work to
counter this critical narrative, using “Mine Own John Poins,” The Steele Glas, The
Adventures of Jack of Newbury, and The Unfortunate Traveller to show how early
modern English satire participated in a general trend toward open-ended inquiry, even
while demonstrating the kind of specificity that typified contemporary political discourse.
According to a common folk etymology, prevalent throughout the medieval era
and persisting well into the seventeenth century, the English word satire derived from
Greek satyr, a mythological creature of unrestrained and earthy appetites. Half man and
half goat, the bawdy humor of the satyr play served as a respite to the ponderous
solemnity of classical tragedy during the Athenian Dionysia. Through a confusion of
Greek and Roman sources, medieval commentators conflated the rough demeanor and
unpolished behavior of the satyr with what they perceived to be to the bluntness and
candor of the satirist. 12 The twelfth-century German schoolmaster Conrad of Hirsau held
that satire “gets its name from the naked, mocking satyrs, because in this poem depraved
morals are stripped of their clothing and mocked.”13 Similarly, his contemporary William
of Conches, a leading faculty member at the cathedral school of Chartres, writes in his
accessus to Juvenal that “there are some writers who cover up [velant] their
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reprehension… [but] true satire consists of naked and open reprehension.”14 Some
centuries later, in the prologue to his Commentary on Dante’s Comedy, Guido da Pisa
explains that, just as “Satyrs are capricious and nimble creatures, naked and shameless
and mockers of all men,” so satire derives its name because it is “naked and shameless
…[and] openly criticizes vices.”15 It should be noted that these same commentators were
aware of a contending and (as it happens) more accurate etymology: the Latin satura, or
“miscellany.”16 Nevertheless, the notion had taken hold that the satirist was an exemplar
of unembellished and unequivocal speech. In the wake of the twelfth-century renaissance,
scholastic pedagogues valued poets such as Horace and Juvenal as useful instructional
tools precisely because of the perceived “hermeneutical transparency”17 of their texts.
The apparent literalness of Lucilius, Horace, Juvenal, and Persius facilitated the teaching
of Latin grammar, and thus cemented their place within the classical trivium. According
to Rita Copeland:
In elementary Latin instruction in the twelfth century, satire was a
preferred genre for teaching Latin – and thus literacy – to young boys
because satire was understood to operate at the literal level. Traditional
generic classifications of satire, beginning in later antiquity, lay stress
upon its etymological association with ‘naked satyrs,’ carrying that over –
in metaphor – as the hermeneutical ‘nudity’ of satire.18
It is precisely this theory that early modern theorists inherited and largely
maintained, often clinging to the position of their predecessors that the satirist was a
literary type of ringing moral clarity. Questions of epistemology and axiology, of what
could be known and what should be done, were foregone conclusions, and the function of
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the satirist was simply to police established boundaries. Moreover, like their medieval
counterparts, these theorists continued to see the satyr figure itself as a kind of literary
forbearer of the early-modern satirist’s persona. In the early sixteenth century, the Italian
humanist Polydore Vergil defined a satire as “a Poesie, rebuking vices sharpely, not
regarding any persones…. [It] is very railing, onely ordained to rebuke vice…. The
Satires had their name of uplandishe Goddes, that were rude, lassivious and wanton of
behavior.”19 Thomas Lodge held that satirists drew from “the lives of Satyers, so that
they might wiseley, under the abuse of that name, discover the follies of many theyr
folish fellow citesens.”20 George Puttenham writes that, so that their moral certainty
“should breed none ill will, … [early satirists] made wise as if the gods of the woods,
whom they called satyrs or sylvans.” 21 Notably, the satirist not only uses the wild
persona of the satyr to excuse his bitter rebukes, but also draws from the satyr’s demi-god
status to indicate his access to a fixed and timeless wisdom, “to make their admonitions
and reproofs seem graver and of more efficacy.”22 The satirist’s function is not to
determine what might be right or to explore the implications of an established standard,
only to “discover” where such undisputed standards have been transgressed. Expanding
the medieval notion of semantic clarity to evoke a fixed moral certainty, these early
modern theorists saw the satirist as a kind of accessory to an unchanging and
unquestioned standard from which he derived both his purpose and authority.
For sixteenth-century English writers, such bitter rebukes were modelled and
authorized by the second-century Roman poet Juvenal, whose “furious rhetoric” was seen
as a natural extension of the railing satyr figure of classical drama.23 It was this shocking
and polarizing Juvenalian strain that informed the Martin Marprelate controversy of
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1588-89 and the sudden but short-lived vogue of the English satyr in the 1590s, and
which was doubtless at least partly responsible for the Bishops’ Ban mentioned above.
Even in the wake of the seminal 1605 text De Satyrica Graecorum Poesi et Romanorum
Satira, in which Isaac Casaubon carefully extricates Roman satire from the Greek satyr
plays, the dominant conception of the satirist as an uncouth and railing figure who
unequivocally patrolled well-defined moral boundaries persisted well into the
seventeenth century.24 There was, however, a secondary strain of satire of which
sixteenth-century theorists were aware. The witty and urbane Horace provided a counter
to the rough denunciations of Juvenal. Horace’s influence is plain in the comparatively
mild ribbing and irony of Utopia and In Praise of Folly, and it is the Horatian model that
Sir Philip Sidney intends when he writes that the satirist “sportingly neuer leaueth vntil
hee make a man laugh at folly, and, at length ashamed, to laugh at himselfe.”25 But,
generally speaking, Elizabethan theorists veered away from the urbane Horace when
describing satire, preferring the putative ferocity of Juvenal, which better fit what Dustin
Griffin has termed their “markedly deficient”26 theory. Most often, sixteenth-century
theory struggled to reconcile Horace’s open-ended polyvocality with what was largely
seen as a Juvenalian, i.e. harsh and inflexible, literary form.27 From the time of its first
English translation by Thomas Drant in 1566, Horace’s work posed problems for a
literary community still bound to a dogmatic conception of satire. Colin Burrow notes the
“weird accuracy” of Drant’s preface to his translation of the Sermones, the translator’s
unease with poems he reads as “deliberately fashioned to resist the extraction of
dogma.”28 Likewise, Neel Mukherjee points to “Drant's inability to understand the term
‘sermones,’ ‘conversations.’ He misses the chatty, multivocal, gossipy, occasionally
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bitchy tone of the Sermones and tries to substitute it with a rigidly moral discourse.”29 So
entrenched was the medieval model of the castigating satyr figure that early modern
theorists opted “to construct [Horace] as a sage passing acid judgment on human follies”
rather than expand their theory to accommodate his “laughing, teasing voice.” 30
Twentieth-century critical approaches to genre, of course, changed according to
the evolution of literary criticism itself. Critics were no longer so sure about satire’s
contours. Alastair Fowler admits that satire is "the most problematic mode to the
taxonomist, since it appears never to have corresponded to any one kind,"31 and George
Test compares “attempting to define satire [to] trying to put a shadow in a sack.”32 Still,
many mid-century writers continued to see the genre as a closed form, largely
conservative in its world view, aimed at a homogeneous readership whose social values
undergirded and were reinforced by the satirist’s stance. The deep-rooted idea of satire as
dogmatic and unambiguous is typified in the work of Alvin Kernan, who writes that “the
basic components of satire, scene, satirist, and plot remain fairly constant in all ages
because they are always the expression of an unchanging sense of life.”33 Detailing the
convergence of the “simple piety, humility, and honest poverty”34 of the English
Plowman’s Tradition and classical Juvenalian elements to produce the bitterness and
“soaring rhetoric” of Nashe’s Pierce Penilesse and the “sadistic…rough work” of John
Marston’s Kinsayder,35 he holds to the enduring opinion that the satire is, almost by
definition, typified “by a firm and definite understanding of the moral issues involved.”36
Similarly, despite providing a nuanced discussion of the relationship between satire and
irony, Jean Weisgerber shares the tendency to limit satire to clear-cut means and motives.
Weisgerber argues that, while irony and satire share a theatrical component and indirect
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mode of attack, they are differentiated by their respective goals: Whereas satire seeks to
“convey a norm,” the purpose of irony is to “urge a search after unknown truth.”37
Not until recently have scholars begun to consider how satire engages with
contemporary issues in ways other than attack, be it straightforward or oblique. Dustin
Griffin writes that much satire uses such moral certainties as a point of departure, rather
than the destination. The satirists begin by using ridicule, irony, parody, etc. to expose
how people fall short of moral imperatives. But they move on to do something more,
often questioning those very imperatives. There is little compelling about simple
insistence on agreed-upon moral codes, beyond the readers’ self-satisfaction of knowing
that they are on the right side of the moral boundary. As Griffin points out, the “best”
satires, those of compelling complexity and subtlety, those to which we continually
return, move beyond simply patrolling moral boundaries and instead explore the contours
of those boundaries, detailing not only where actors fall short but where the guiding
assumptions themselves are suggested to be untenable, inconsistent, or at risk of
becoming irrelevant. Satire’s topical/contemporary nature means that the mode is
invariably linked to newly arisen and not yet settled questions of value and policy, and
Tudor satirists were using the mode to confront sweeping economic and political changes
during the sixteenth century.
Contrary to the theories of many of their predecessors, their contemporaries, and
their successors, the satirists I consider write satire that defies simple narrative closure. In
different ways and to varying degrees, they all incorporate satire’s spirit of open-ended
inquiry. At the same time, they demonstrate a specificity akin to the reformist writers of
their own day. Instead of basing their political and economic critiques solely on general
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and established moral norms, they exploit satire’s capacity to complicate and
problematize certainties—a capacity at odds with the bulk of both pre-modern and
modern theory—and then suggest revisions that are themselves left open-ended and
subject to revision.
I begin with Thomas Wyatt, who opens “Mine Own John Poins” with a traditional
detailing of straightforward criticisms of the court, but then moves on to suggesting that
these moral failings, themselves little more than a reiteration of agreed upon standards,
are related to institutional changes of the 1530-40s. Largely conventional in his humanist
anxiety regarding the misuse of language among courtiers, he notably diverges from the
Mirror for Magistrates tradition by suggesting that duplicity may stem from the King’s
own authoritarian consolidation of power. More innovatively, he concludes his satire
with an open-ended invitation to his addressee, a marked departure from Alamanni’s
original poem and a move that resists simple closure. Theorists have often noted satire’s
failure to provide resolution, seeing it as problematic and, perhaps, indicative of its
ineffectiveness. Kernan, for example, sees satire as most often ending with a “mere
intensification of the unpleasant situation with which satire opens.”38 Indeed, this would
seem to be the case in Wyatt’s source material. However, by replacing Alamanni’s
concluding attack on the rustic locals with an invitation to Poins to join him in Kent,
Wyatt reveals a Horatian open-endedness and an implied dialogism. Wyatt’s debt to
Horace has been amply treated by scholars.39 What I contribute to this conversation is a
close reading of just how “Mine Own John Poins” counters the immediate institutional
reforms of the 1530s. By capitalizing on satire’s capacity for open-endedness, Wyatt
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makes the poem itself into a gestural counterbalance to the monologism of the Henrician
court.
Of the four satirists I discuss, George Gascoigne provides the starkest example of
ambiguity in his adaptation of the Ovidian myth of Philomela. Long read as a fable of
how art might extract beauty from tragedy, the story of Philomela’s rape, retaliatory
infanticide, and final metamorphosis is in The Steel Glas transferred from the aesthetic
into the moral sphere. Used by Gascoigne as a symbol of both himself and satire,
Philomela becomes a multivalent vehicle for excusing Gascoigne’s personal failures,
justifying the satirist’s voice, and modelling a process of rejuvenation for the
commonwealth at large. In The Steele Glas, the figure of Philomela allows Gascoigne to
present himself as both victimized and delinquent, thereby complicating the idea of
satirist as moral arbiter and avoiding “righteous isolation.”40 He thus presents himself as a
microcosm of the commonwealth. He encounters himself in the unburnished mirror of his
own satire, describing the pain and how to meet it, and thereby models for each reader
how satire might be used. Gascoigne’s adaptation of Ovid serves as prologue to what is
otherwise a traditional estates satire, grounded on rigid and schematic form and an
unchanging hierarchical social model. However, this idiosyncratic interpretation of
classical material infuses his subsequent social critique with a dynamism not found in
earlier examples of the genre.
Of the four writers discussed here, Thomas Deloney was the only one derived
from the artisan class, and this informed his later career as a professional writer. Trained
as a silk weaver, Deloney turned to writing as a profession in the 1580s, repeatedly
falling afoul of the authorities for publishing complaints against foreign weavers and
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grain shortages. For that reason, we might understand the satiric episode of the ants and
the grasshopper in chapter three of Jack of Newbury in light of a specific economic issue
of the 1590s. The monopolies granted by the Crown to its favorites had long been a
subject of contention and would continue to be until the 1624 Statute of Monopolies put
the matter to rest. In the episode Deloney uses parody to both ridicule and appropriate the
King’s voice. Parody allows Jack to show the porosity of the division between king and
commoner, a porosity that he exploits in order to both honor his monarch and criticize his
failure to protect the economic interests of his subjects.
Finally, I turn to Thomas Nashe’s The Unfortunate Traveller, which incorporates
nearly all the elements of contending satire theory I have mentioned. Nashe’s work
exemplifies both etymologies of satire: Jack Wilton is an indisputable satyr figure whose
straightforward raillery spares no one, and The Unfortunate Traveller itself is a copious
mélange of literary, moral, political, and economic criticism. The most Juvenalian of my
four satirists, Nashe (somewhat paradoxically) also embodies the kind of open-ended
constructive ambiguity too often unnoticed in Tudor satire. Although the figure of Jack
Wilton evinces a staunch conservatism at times, he is also a rogue who consistently
undercuts all moral norms in the pursuit of a decidedly unenlightened self-interest. The
episodic text resists narrative closure, but I hold that Nashe’s use of irony and parody in
the paratext works to construct an economic market as an alternative to the inadequate
patronage economy. In a very real sense, Nashe’s indiscriminate satire clears the ground
of literary, economic, and moral preconceptions, making a space into which he can insert
his own narrative as both a literary and economic product that will be evaluated
according to its own merits and use-value. Nashe thus epitomizes a constructive
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ambiguity, an overabundance of meaning that accommodates apparently irresolvable
contradictions, and yet still advances an alternative to the economic woes of the
professional English writer of the 1590s.
Thomas Wyatt, George Gascoigne, Thomas Deloney, and Thomas Nashe are too
few and too different in their beliefs to constitute a political program or scheme of early
modern English satire. But read together they evince a more inductive method of satiric
exploration than has been fully appreciated. They are affiliated, albeit perhaps loosely, by
a shared concern for the shifting political and economic landscape of sixteenth-century
England. While their general moral underpinnings are largely traditional, their approach
to government institutions, social analysis, and economic policies suggest an innovation
that moves them beyond established models. Like the sailors on Neurath’s boat, they
must stand on one plank while replacing another, and gradually reconstruct their vessel.
In order to understand this constructive nature of early modern satire, I will now look at
how these satires were broad and flexible enough to accommodate both established and
novel ideas of the English commonwealth.
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Chapter One
“In Kent and Christendom”: The Construction of Alternative Political Space in
Thomas Wyatt’s Adaptation of Alamanni’s Tenth Satire
Thomas Wyatt’s “Mine Own John Poins,” likely written around 1536, is often
read as a rejection of the “advertised but blatantly corrupt humanism of the treacherous
Henrician court.”1 Indeed, the poem does participate in the anti-court tradition of its
source, Luigi Alamanni’s 10th Satire. Both Alamanni’s Italian original and Wyatt’s close
English translation catalogue the flattery, deceit, and untrammeled self-interest that typify
court culture; and both the original and the adaptation appear to conclude that a life of
rural retirement is superior to the struggle for preferment and patronage that is the
courtier’s lot. However, as Donald L. Guss points out, Wyatt’s persona focuses more on
what drove him from court rather than what attracts him to the country life. Whereas
Alamanni’s persona has chosen to escape the corrupt atmosphere of court, Wyatt’s
persona has been compelled by his own honest nature to accept rustication far from the
center of power. Thus, the subtle changes Wyatt makes to his model convert “a praise of
Horatian ease to a declaration of Stoic virtue.”2 Beginning with the important distinction
that Guss draws, I want to advance the idea that Wyatt departs even further from the
Horatian ideal of otium extolled in Alamanni’s original. Beyond simply decrying the
corruption of humanist values at court or accepting his own displacement from public
office, Wyatt is using the satiric mode to analyze closely the political situation in England
during the 1530s and to explore tentatively an alternative to the oppressive centralization
of power at the Henrician court. Rather than focusing on the resigned withdrawal that is
often the interpretive focus of critical responses to the verse epistle, I want to consider
how Wyatt’s persona is assuming a stance more politically active than previously
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recognized. While Wyatt draws from the classical republicanism and Italian civic
humanism informing Alamanni’s original, he is satisfied neither with the profound
symbolism of Cato’s suicide nor with Alamanni’s bitter marginalization. Instead, he
exploits satire’s capacity for dialogism to gesture toward a jurisdiction outside of the
Court as a countermeasure to the tyranny of Henry VIII. By concluding with an invitation
to his adversarius, Wyatt inserts the possibility of continued political conversation outside
of the Henrician Court and, indeed, beyond the confines of the poem itself. Wyatt’s openended adaptation acts centrifugally, suggesting a political identity as analyst and
collaborator beyond the traditional role of counsel to a king.
Before we turn to Wyatt’s poem, we should establish the political context that
shaped it. Upon his ascension to the English throne in 1509, Henry VIII was hailed by
poets and humanist scholars as the perfect corrective to the authoritarianism of his father,
Henry VII. Of course, as Greg Walker points out, “optimism is virtually compulsory
when it comes to coronations,”3 a truism aptly borne out by Polydore Vergil’s praise of
the as yet untested King’s “humanity, benevolence, and self-control.” Still, early in his
reign, Henry VIII’s actions seem to have justified that optimism and met expectations of
liberality. Edward Hall records that in the first year of his rule Henry VIII pardoned the
Duke of Buckingham “of treason laied vnto hym, but not proued”; dispatched aid in the
form of 300 men to Calais, at that time beset by the plague; and called Parliament for the
first time in six years, at which time William Empson and Edmund Dudley, financial
ministers to the previous King, were imprisoned on charges of constructive treason.
Henry VII had relied largely on bonds, recognizances, and bills of attainders to keep the
nobility in check and safeguard his power base, and Dudley and Empson were widely
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believed to be responsible for these unpopular policies.4 In an apparent attempt to
distance himself from his father’s unpopular policies, Henry VIII imprisoned and
ultimately ordered the execution of Dudley, who was perceived as having been the
architect of the harsh oppressive economic program. Hall’s enthusiastic account of the
“lustye, young, and coragious”5 King’s liberality indicates the “London gossip of the
time, the public perception of the young, exuberant, confident”6 Henry VIII.
But this sense of liberality changed over the course of time and came to a head
with the advent of the King’s “Great Matter”: Henry’s protracted struggle to secure a
divorce from his first wife, Catherine of Aragon, who had been unable to provide Henry
with a male heir. Unable to obtain a divorce from Pope Clement VII, who balked at
wronging the daughter of Spanish monarch and the aunt of the Holy Roman Emperor,
Henry embarked on a series of actions that would result ultimately in England’s break
with Rome. These actions fundamentally changed the institutional framework of
government in England. The rupture between the English crown and the Catholic Church
in Rome not only contributed to the secularization that typified the early modern period
in England, it also furthered the centralization of political and legal authority that had
begun in England with Henry VII. Despite the liberality that typified the opening years of
Henry VIII’s reign, the break with Rome in the 1530s would be accompanied by Crown
policies that some felt encroached upon the personal liberties traditionally afforded
English subjects. Denying Papal authority in England would create a power vacuum, and
Henry’s assumption of the legal powers historically held by the Catholic Church
endowed the Crown with an unprecedented absolutist character.7
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Henry’s break with Rome was welcomed by certain quarters in England, largely
because of what was viewed as the Church’s unwarranted incursion into spheres of
economic activity. As early as 1510, Edmund Dudley had warned in The Tree of
Commonwealth that the King needed to be on guard against the temporal ambitions of the
clergy. Quentin Skinner writes that, “far from being conservative, Dudley’s doctrine is
virtually Marsiglian in character,”8 a reference to Marsilius of Padua, whose Defensor
pacis of 1324 denied all papal authority and advocated a supreme monarch at the head of
both church and state. (Henry’s chancellor, Thomas Cromwell, had the tract translated
into English in 1535.) Similarly, the Supplication for the Beggars, printed anonymously
in 1529, argued that the clergy possessed “half of the hole substaunce of the realme” and
goaded Henry VIII with the claim that bishops were “stronger in your owne parliament
house then your silfe.”9 Hall’s Chronicle records how, in 1530, the House of Commons
complained “of the griefs wherewith the spirituality had before time grievously oppressed
them, both contrary to the law of the realm, and contrary to all right.” The “six great
causes” that moved the Commons to censure so vehemently members of the Church were
largely economic: “excess fines…great polling,” the occupation of lands by priests,
engaging in buying and selling of wool, “having their living of their flock, while lying in
the court in lord’s houses,” and unlettered priests holding multiple benefices and
ministering adequately to none. 10 Regardless of whether Henry’s motives for breaking
with Rome were personal or political, religious or economic, his actions were initially
perceived by many of his subjects as duly restraining a spiritual power that had become
all too worldly in its goals and holdings.
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But the optimism attendant on Henry’s theological renovations soured with time.
Ethan Shagan notes that the correlation between “godly Reformation and economic
renewal” was used by the circle of humanist writers gathered by Thomas Cromwell in the
1530s to support Royal Supremacy, but goes on to note that this was a “hopeful naiveté
typical of the first generation Protestants not yet jaded by harsh political realities.”11 As
the decade drew on, and Henry’s rule became more autocratic, the role of the humanist
counsellor at the English court became uncertain and, at times, mortally dangerous. In
July 1533, Pope Clement VII formally ruled in favor of Catherine of Aragon and denied
Henry the divorce he had been pursuing since 1527. What followed was a series of acts
that effectively transferred all political, legal, and economic claims of the Roman
Catholic Church in England to Henry, thereby enabling the English king to bypass Rome
in his quest to dissolve his marriage. First, the Ecclesiastical Appeals Act of 1532,
penned by Cromwell at the behest of Henry, argued that England was an empire and, as
such, lay outside the jurisdiction of Rome. This arrogation of ecclesiastic authority made
the King the final legal voice in England. Cromwell carefully guided the Act through
Parliament to create the impression that the legal maneuver was a popular rather than
royal initiative, and the Act was subsequently used by Archbishop Thomas Cranmer to
warrant the annulment of the King’s marriage to Catherine. (Both Cranmer and Henry
were consequently excommunicated from the Roman Catholic Church.) Second, whether
spurred by the King’s defiance toward Rome, persuaded by his “coercive and even
terrorist tactics,”12 or eager to clear the way for a royal marriage that might produce a
male heir, Parliament passed the Act of Supremacy in 1534, making the King supreme
head of the Church in England. Benefit of clergy and sanctuary for those accused of high
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treason were abolished as legal loopholes. Apart from the religious/theological
repercussions, this further enhanced the legal authority of the crown. Third, Parliament
passed the Treasons Act of 1534, making any disavowal of the Royal Supremacy
punishable by death. The Treasons Act meant that “words alone would now constitute
treason in King Henry’s commonwealth.”13 Rather than an authority limited by his role as
King-in-Parliament, Henry was enabled by these acts to exercise a prerogative that was
“essentially personal.”14 Perhaps most notable is the fact that in the same year, the King
declared it treason for anyone to refer to him as a tyrant.15
These strictures on speech complicated the issue of good counsel, which
throughout the sixteenth century was viewed by humanists as the “touchstone of
government.”16 Advice tendered to the sovereign served a political and moral purpose:
informing the sovereign and offsetting tyrannical tendencies. English humanists during
the 1530s were influenced by Italian civic humanism and its classical antecedents: among
them Aristotle’s Politics and Cicero’s De Officiis. The challenge for English humanists
lay in adapting the Continental model, native to the republican city-states of the Italian
peninsula, to the “cursus honorum prevailing at the royal court”17 of Tudor England. A
series of English pamphlets emerged in the early 1530s exploring the question of how
and when the prudent counsellor should offer his advice to the monarch, how to
safeguard against flatterers, and how to best guide the monarch along the path of a just
and moral rule. However, by 1536 the King’s council had undergone a series of changes
that effectively limited its membership to a select few of the King’s favorites, an
institutional change “seen by those who were excluded to have narrowed in favor of a
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courtly and bureaucratic elite.”18 Thus, the humanist ideal of counsel was thwarted in
terms of what could be said and also in terms of who could say it.
Alamanni’s original poem and Wyatt’s adaptation each address the problem of
exclusion, what Arthur Ferguson terms “the dilemma of the ‘unattached intellectual.’”19
Both poets were courtiers/diplomats/ambassadors—Alamanni in Florence and Wyatt in
England—and both encountered displacement as a result of political circumstances.
Following an abortive plot against Giulio de' Medici in 1522, Alamanni spent much of
his adult life in France rather than live under thrall of the Medici in his native Florence.20
Wyatt was twice imprisoned and subsequently rusticated, once in 1536 and again in
1541. However, the poets come to very different conclusions regarding what each
believes to be a debased court culture. Alamanni withdraws to lick his wounds. His satire
does not look beyond the immediate political crisis. Perhaps because he comes from a
tradition of republicanism, he is incapable or unwilling to accept any part of what he
views as the tyranny of the Medici in Florence. He therefore withdraws altogether and
extols the life of rural retirement. Wyatt, however, coming from a tradition of monarchy,
and aware of the lessons the previous century had taught England about the dangers of
weak and shifting kingship, is more compelled to address the problem constructively,
applying the humanist idea of counsel to forge a political bond outside of the court. While
Wyatt’s letter to Poins opens with a conventional attack on deceit, the satire is more
analytical and constructive than hereto acknowledged, tracing the source of moral failings
to the political environment of the 1530s and intimating that political relationships
outside the Court may be a useful corrective to the problems of centralization.
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Wyatt’s satire begins by cataloguing the lies and flattery that characterize the
Henrician court. This absence of honest speech at court is more than a moral problem: It
has significant political implications. Like many of his contemporaries, Wyatt
understands the humanist principle of counsel and its necessity in a healthy
commonwealth. From a strictly practical point of view, the language of counsel is needed
for effective administration of the realm. Thomas Elyot exemplifies this belief in The
Book Named the Governor, written in 1531, less than a decade before Wyatt’s satire.
Elyot explains that
one mortal man cannot have knowledge of all things done in a realm or
large dominion, and at one time discuss all controversies, reform all
transgressions, and exploit all consultations … it is expedient and also
needful that under the capital governor be sundry mean authorities, as it
were aiding him in the distribution of justice in sundry parts of a huge
multitude.21
The exigencies of effecting a just rule over a large expanse require that magistrates,
courtiers, and other “mean authorities” supply information to the monarch. Even though
the king is the supreme authority, reason dictates that a just and effective rule requires
that he avail himself of these reports. In practice, however,
it must be noted that officials were expected to wait for their monarchs to
seek their advice before they offered it. According to authors of
contemporary treatises, rather than impress upon a ruler some new
unsought-after policy, courtiers were more likely to flatter royal opinions
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in the hope of winning greater rewards for their clients and of extending
their patronage networks.22
But in order for such counsel to be truly expedient to the commonwealth, it must be
candid, and this is not the kind of counsel that is being offered at Henry’s court. Instead
of honest counsellors, Wyatt’s persona sees at court sycophants who
Grin when he laugheth that beareth all the sway,
Frown when he frowneth and groan when is pale;
On others' lust to hang both night and day [.] (53-55)
Rather than existing as an integrative exchange between ruler and his counsellors, the
court operates according to the “lust” and whim of the monarch. Wyatt’s speaker
continually reminds his reader that the flattery is a verbal phenomenon. Hence, he cannot
“say that favel hath a goodly grace/ In eloquence” (67-68) as, we assume, other courtiers
do. That is, he cannot conflate dissimulation with good speech. This gives a distinctively
moral cast to true eloquence as the speaker understands it.
What follows is a congeries that catalogues the misuse of language at court, and
although the speaker insists that he cannot participate in them (this is, ostensibly, the
motive for his departure) he can nevertheless describe them in vivid detail. He says that
I am not he such eloquence to boast
To make the crow singing as the swan;
Nor call the liond of cowardes beasts the most
That cannot take a mouse as the cat can;
And he that dieth for hunger of the gold
Call him Alexander; and say that Pan
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Passeth Apollo in music many fold;
Praise Sir Thopias for a noble tale,
And scorn the story that the Knight told [.] (43-51)
His inability to “turn the word that from my mouth is gone” (30) suggests that, once
spoken, a word takes on a life of its own, at least it should. Wyatt (as the translator of
Plutarch) surely would have known that the Greek word for “turn,” tropos, was the root
of the English word “trope,” those figures of speech used by both orators and sophists
alike to reach such dissimilar ends. A spoken word should remain immutable, not be
manipulated for personal advantage, and yet it is possible to do so. This was the
conundrum with which the advocates of humanist counsel were to struggle. Rhetorical
skill was to be cultivated for its use in the administration of the commonwealth. But that
same linguistic proficiency could be put to venal designs completely at odds with the
interest of the commonwealth. For critics of the humanist agenda, “The courtier as
dissembler separate[d] res and verba.” Such men assumed inscrutable rhetorical roles, the
identity and intentions of which were in a “process of permanent change.”23 But English
humanists during the early sixteenth century “distinguished carefully between ‘true
eloquence’ and ‘sophistry,’ perceiving in the latter a perversion, not a consequence of the
former.”24
However, this idealism faded with the advent of what Richard Tuck has termed
the “new humanism”25 in the mid-sixteenth century. Prior to this time, English humanists
had subscribed to a Ciceronian belief in the efficacy of language in the pursuit of
classical political virtues, and it is this Ciceronian humanism that Wyatt’s speaker is
seeing undermined at court. According to Tuck, this optimistic political model was
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displaced by one informed by the skepticism of Tacitus and the writings of Guicciardini
and Machiavelli, who took a more pragmatic view of the relationship between politics,
ethics, and self-interest. A similar skepticism pervades the lines of Wyatt’s speaker, who
criticizes not only those who “Use willes for wit,” but those who “call craft counsel, for
profit still to paint” (32-33). The reasons for the speaker’s withdrawal from court is not
simply the cunning and insincerity that he finds there, but rather the antagonism between
self-interest and the benefit of the polity that is the underlying cause of the deceit.
Having focused his criticism on members of the King’s retinue, the speaker
concentrates his attention on the very center of the court: the King himself. His catalogue
of court vices reaches its culmination when he denies that he can call “The lecher a lover;
and tyranny/ To be the right of a prince's reign” (74-75). As in much of Wyatt’s lyric
poetry, drawing as it does from the discourse of courtly love, the erotic and the political
converge in the satire.26 A Petrarchan contrariety of fidelity and frustration leads to the
emotional and thematic climax of the poem: “I cannot, I; no, no, it will not be!” Until this
point, the speaker has phrased his dilemma using the anaphora “I cannot” (lines 19, 22,
25, 28, 31, 34, 57, 76). Now, the tension of his situation, expressed in his stuttering
iterations—“I…I; no, no”— forces him to admit that it will not be. Read aloud (aye…aye;
no, no) the line encapsulates the insufferable conflict between the speaker’s sense of duty
to the monarch and his denunciation of the stark realities of court life. The grammatical
change indicates a shift in the speaker’s focus from a personal inability to an external
state of affairs. The speaker has come to an impasse, forcing him to admit that the
problem lies not simply with individual courtiers, but with the nature of the court culture
itself. The very next line—“This is the cause that I could never yet/ Hang on their
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sleeves” (77-78)—reminds the reader that this entire poem has been an analysis of sorts,
an examination of relationships with a view to assigning causality. Beyond merely
inventorying moral failings at court, the poem suggests that tyranny itself is implicated in
the endemic corruption that has driven the speaker into solitude.
Early sixteenth-century humanists such as Alamanni and Wyatt readily drew from
classical sources when defining tyranny and considering its effects. Book Five of
Aristotle’s Politics defines tyranny as the “arbitrary power of an individual…responsible
to no one, [that governs]…with a view to its own advantage, not to that of its subjects.”27
It was an axiom of classical writers that despotism created a corrupt environment of
flattery and deceit. Aristotle goes on to say that, under the rule of a tyrant, the flatterer
holds “great power.”28 Similarly, Cicero begins Book Two of De Officiis by explaining
why he turned from oratory to writing when “everything passed under the absolute
control of a despot and there was no longer any room for statesmanship or authority of
mine… [W]hen the republic, to which all my care and thought and effort used to be
devoted, was no more, then, of course, my voice was silenced in the forum and in the
senate.”29 England, unlike Cicero’s Rome and Alamanni’s Florence, had never been a
republic. But the Henrician reforms of the 1530s—Henry’s Acts of Appeals and Acts of
Supremacy, the consolidation of the Privy Council into an institution with fewer numbers
and more authority—resulted in an unprecedented centralization of authority,
concentrating power in the hands of the few and threatening both the liberty and the
prosperity of the commonwealth at large. Wyatt’s adaptation of Alamanni’s poem
suggests that his speaker is not merely disdaining the moral faults of others but is chafing
under the yoke of an authority that precludes his living an effective political life.
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Alamanni’s speaker refuses to “seguir Signiori & Regi” (5), to “follow gentlemen and
Kings,” any longer. Wyatt’s adaptation is far more caustic than Alamanni’s poem is in its
indictment of those in power: he will not “live thrall under the awe/ Of lordly looks” (45). The change from following to living under thrall indicates that a far broader power is
under consideration. Harold Andrew Mason rightly comments that “the bitterness [of the
line]…is all Wyatt’s.”30 Indeed, whereas Alamanni’s line implies service to an authority
that is at worst supercilious, Wyatt’s diction indicates servitude to a power that
encroaches on all aspects of life. This disparity might be attributed to the difference in
circumstances between the two writers. Alamanni is addressing the return of the Medici
to Florence, an unwelcome but not unprecedented shift in the power structure of the city.
By contrast, Wyatt is reacting to the fundamental transformation of Crown power during
the late Henrician regime in England. Bearing this in mind, Wyatt’s speaker’s claim that
he “cannot crouch nor kneel to do so great a wrong,/ To worship them, like God on earth
alone” (25-26), while a close translation of Alamanni’s “Non saprei piu ch’ a gli
immortali Dei,/ Rendere honor con le ginocchia inchine” (25-26), intimates
dissatisfaction with Henry’s incorporation of church powers into the Crown’s jurisdiction
during the 1530s.
In further considering Wyatt’s analysis of the problem as more politically pointed
than Alamanni’s, I want to return to the opening lines, which open the poem with a
traditional device of direct satire: the speaker’s response to an adversarius, a character
who functions to elicit the satirist’s comments. In this case, it is John Poins, a friend of
Wyatt’s about whom we know little other than that he was a courtier and MP, who has
apparently asked Wyatt why he has absented himself from court. We do not actually hear
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Poins’s voice, as the poem is written in the form of an epistolary satire. That is, it is a
letter in the tradition of Horace’s Epistles. The purpose of the letter is to explain
The cause why that homeward I me draw,
And flee the press of courts, whereso they go,
Rather than to live thrall under the awe
Of lordly looks, wrapped within my cloak,
To will and lust learning to set a law. (2-6)
These opening lines reveal that the speaker’s retirement is not one of inactivity: he is
engaged in some sort of intellectual or moral work—or both. The legal idiom of the
lines—courts, thrall, set a law—suggest that his time is spent in some sort of regulatory
activity. The speaker “cannot wrest the law to fill the coffer/ With innocent blood to feed
myself fat” (34-35), but beyond merely avoiding the exploitative “press of courts” and
the imperiousness of “lordly looks,” he has withdrawn to study the problem of placeseeking and tyranny. The idiom “set a law” suggests a change in policy, an attempt to
assay a problem and administer a corrective. There is a patent difference here between
Alamanni and Wyatt. Alamanni’s speaker makes no reference to law. He has retreated to
rural Provence in order to “temprando ‘l mio infinito duolo” (6), to “temper my extreme
sadness.”31 He is simply avoiding the corruption of the court and the personal displeasure
it causes him. Wyatt’s speaker, by contrast, employs a legal idiom that connotes he is
actively engaging in an analysis of the political situation: the nature and distribution of
authority and power.
In his verse letters, Horace often reflects upon the advantages of rural living as
opposed to the temptations and corruption of court life, and some critics have argued that
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this is the gist of Wyatt’s satire, as well. Mervyn James, for instance, sees in Wyatt’s
poetry a retreat to “the quietist joys of the countryside and the simple life.”32 However a
closer inspection of Wyatt’s language reveals that there is more occurring here than idle
reclusion. Wyatt’s explanation that “homeward I me draw/…To will and lust learning to
set a law,” while seemingly innocuous at first, will become problematic as the poem
unfolds. There is critical speculation that the poem may have been written during a period
of forced retirement to his father’s estates in Kent.33 If so, the poet may indeed be
spending his time curbing his own “will and lust.” But given that the next 70 lines
catalogue the greed and dishonesty of the court, vices which he declares are beyond his
ability to tolerate, much less take part in, a reader must question exactly upon whose
“will and lust” he is attempting to “set a law.” The implication seems to be that, at home
in Kent, removed from the court, the speaker is better able to establish a code of conduct
based on learning and rationality rather than willfulness and appetite. Beyond his own
appetites, the speaker is exploring the ethics of counsel at Henry’s court. His tactical
retreat may be an opportunity for personal self-reflection (whether voluntary or enforced),
but it is even more likely that it is a period of analysis of the court, the fruit of which is
the satire itself.
As I discuss below, the constructive elements of Wyatt’s satire become more
apparent as his adaptation deviates from Alamanni’s original in the final third of the
poem. For now, it is important that Wyatt’s speaker immediately establishes a certain
decorum: a consistency between tone and purpose. One aiming to set a law to the
willfulness and appetite of courtiers who “[set] their part/ With Venus and Bacchus all
their life long” (23) should, accordingly, abjure the style of courtiers who “asken help of
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colours of device/ To join the mean with each extremity” (59-60). Wyatt’s speaker
therefore establishes his equanimity early in the poem by ensuring Poins that he has not
withdrawn merely to
…scorn or mock
The power of them to whom Fortune hath lent
Charge over us, of right to strike the stroke. (7-9)
Nor, as he reminds Poins later in the poem, is he able to call the courtier “true and plain/
That raileth reckless to every man's shame” (71-72). Rather than Juvenalian invective,
Wyatt promises that his letter to Poins will be Horatian in tone and purpose. A simple
diatribe against the court will not address the root of the problem. His very mode of
speech models the type of discourse needed to preserve the integrity—again, both moral
and political/social—of the commonwealth. Absenting himself from court protects him
from contamination by the unchecked appetites of others and lets him fortify the rational
capacity central to his Stoic program. Avoiding spleen further distinguishes him not only
from the immorality but, more specifically, the unenlightened self-interest that pervades
the Henrician court. Patricia Thomson notes that Wyatt’s separating himself from his
target is typical of nearly all satirists, but that the “fastidious, intellectual, and selfconscious impulse to define the nature of [his] seclusion” is classical in origin and new to
the English satiric persona.34 In contrast to the “outsider Langland…the irresponsible
Skelton…[and] the mudslinger Dunbar,” Wyatt’s persona possesses the moral and social
cachet of the classical vir bonus, the good man.35 Beyond an attack on the Henrician
courtiers, the poem is an exploration of the ousted persona’s own identity. Its apophatic
structure is an inductive process whereby the persona is defined according to what he is
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not. As Thomson argues, Wyatt’s satire separates the speaker from the target by detailing
his sequestered experience, but it also strives to redefine the political role of the speaker
at a time of significant political upheaval. Beyond simply cherishing this marker of
prestige in retirement, Wyatt is in fact invoking its authority not only to criticize but to
explore alternatives to the centralization he experiences at court. He is not only the vir
bonus, the well-born man, the traditional counsellor, who draws his mandate from
medieval conception of government. He is a vir bonus, dicendi peritus, the good man
speaking well, an experienced observer of and –more importantly—a participant in
political life of the kingdom.
Wyatt’s declining to “scorn or mock/ The power of them to whom Fortune hath
lent/ Charge over us” (7-8) suggests that, while he may accept the authority of those
above him, he is nevertheless questioning the nature and source of that authority.
Recalling Richard Tuck’s argument that the writings of Machiavelli effected a substantial
change in how mid-sixteenth century humanists discussed ethics and politics, the
particular diction of fortune in regard to authority further signals Wyatt’s speaker’s
political engagement. By the 1530s, fortuna had taken on a particularly political valence.
Florentine contemporaries and near contemporaries of Alamanni developed this notion of
a secular fortune at play in the political and social affairs of human beings. In what would
become a central tenet of humanism, writers such as Pico della Mirandolla, Leon Battista
Alberti, and Niccolo Machiavelli rejected an inexorable Providence as the ultimate
architect of human experience. Machiavelli writes in The Prince that “it may be that
fortune is the arbiter of half our world, but she also leaves half a world to our
governance.”36 Machiavelli was, like Alamanni, a Florentine republican, and extant
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correspondence between the two reveals shared political and literary interests.37 It is
therefore unsurprising to find the politically charged fortune in Alamanni’s original
satire. Patricia Thomson notes that both Alamanni’s and Wyatt’s personae evince a kind
of nobility novel to humanism, “an aristocracy of the mind” according to which “the
good man is impervious to [fortune’s] diverse chances and changes.”38 She credits Wyatt
with importing this philosophy into the English satirical persona. However, her comment
that “‘Fortune’ is but casually referred to” in the poem belies the significance of Wyatt’s
innovation. Quentin Skinner notes Machiavelli’s notion of fortune was accompanied by a
novel concept of virtu, one based not on morality but on efficacy. According to this
paradigm, the virtuous man became a “creative social force, able to shape his own destiny
and remake his social world to fit his own desires.”39 Far from being “impervious” to the
vicissitudes of fortune, as Thomson argues, Alamanni’s and Wyatt’s speakers are, as
evinced by their satires, subject to fortune’s hardships. Chance has conferred on certain
persons an inordinate amount of power, and both speakers are displaced as a result. The
difference between the two is found in their responses to these changes. Despite his
complaint, Alamanni’s speaker does not embody the empowerment, however limited,
that Machiavellian virtu proffers. By contrast, Wyatt’s alterations and unique historical
situation invite us to read his adaptation as a challenge to the political situation he is
describing. Properly historicized, Wyatt’s importation of the term fortune signals a
pragmatic analysis of the English commonwealth at a time when the concept of “the right
to strike the stroke” was undergoing changes both in terms of interpretation and
implementation.
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As we have seen, a paradigmatic example of Fortune’s inscrutable process against
which Wyatt’s satire struggles is the broadening of English royal authority throughout the
1530s. Given the legal idiom employed by Wyatt, the Crown’s relationship to the legal
apparatus of the state throughout the 1530s, which culminated with the 1539 Act of
Proclamations, is an apt context for reading Wyatt’s satire. A 1535 letter from Thomas
Cromwell to the Duke of Norfolk records how the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief
Justice determined that
in case there were no law nor statute made already for any such
purpose…. the proclamations and policies devised by the King and his
Council…should be of as good effect as any law made by Parliament or
otherwise.40
This opinion was codified by the 1539 Act of Proclamations, which established that the
King
may set forth at all times by authority of this act his proclamations…And
that those same shall be obeyed, observed and kept as though they were
made by an act of Parliament for the time in them limited, unless the
King’s Highness dispense with them or any of them under his great seal.41
According to Stephen Gardiner, the Crown felt the bill was necessary because, prior to
the Act itself, “many proclamations were devised…[but] at such thime as the
transgressors should be ponished, the judges would answere, it might not be by the
lawes.”42 In other words, the legality of royal proclamations was being questioned by
judges when it came to time to enforce them. The preamble of the bill itself attests to this,
complaining that royal proclamations in times of crisis have been disputed by some
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subjects who questioned “what a king by his royal powers may do.”43 The issue of both
the Crown and its opponents becomes the relation of royal prerogative to statute law.
Specifically, to what degree did Henry possess the right to enforce his royal decrees? It
would seem that, following the passing of the 1539 Act of Proclamations, Henry could
enforce his personal will by issuing a royal proclamation, effectively circumventing
parliamentary procedure in the establishment of laws.
With the benefit of historical hindsight, Conrad Russell has written that “whether
[the Act was] a serious attempt to give the King a legislative power without Parliament,
we cannot say…. [I]ts effects are obscure.”44 Similarly, H.L Bush, concludes that “the
authority of the Crown was legitimately extended in relation to common and statutory
law, yet in a manner which proved to be of very limited value.”45 In spite of these later
interpretations asserting that the Act’s encroachment on Parliament’s legislative authority
was negligible, the fact remains that it was at the time seen as an alarming extension of
royal prerogative, one ripe with tyrannical potential, and was hotly contested. Robert
Zaller has written that the bill met with “sharp resistance” in the House of Lords, and that
it met with opposition “equally acute, not to say tumultuous” in the House of
Commons.46 The only surviving eye-witness account of the debates in Parliament and
council is that of Bishop Gardiner, who some years later recorded that during “the
passing of [the] act many liberal words were spoken” in Parliament, which ultimately
required of the Crown a “plain promise that, by authority of the act of proclamations,
nothing should be made contrary to an act of parliament or common law.”47 The situation
motivating the bill and Parliamentary responses to it demonstrate that it was perceived as
being potentially tyrannical, that is, as an attempt by Henry to supersede the legislative
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authority of Parliament and concentrate an inordinate amount of legal power in the
Crown.
Wyatt registers concern over the Crown’s legal maneuvering in his choice of
addressee. John Poins was MP for the borough of Devizes in 1529, and although
incomplete records keep us from knowing whether or not he sat in the Parliaments of
1536 or of 1539, when the Statute of Proclamations was debated, it is not beyond the
realm of possibility. Moreover, his name is included in a list of MPs compiled by Thomas
Cromwell in early 1533 that S.T. Bindoff speculates identifies those MPs who opposed
the Statute in Restraint of Appeals. The appearance of Poins’s name on the list suggests a
legal conservatism that makes him a fitting addressee of Wyatt’s satire. Poins, like Wyatt,
who in addition to his ambassadorial duties was MP for Kent in 1542,48 would almost
certainly have intimate knowledge of the debate concerning the King’s legal authority in
both 1533 and 1539. If Poins did, as Bindoff suggests, oppose the 1533 Statute in
Restraint of Appeals, it is reasonable to assume that he may have been among those who
argued against the Statute of Proclamations in 1539. That Wyatt should address to him a
poem in which the legal idiom is so prevalent further suggests that Wyatt is adapting
Alamanni’s original to a specific political situation in England and deploying it in a way
much more politically active than Alamanni’s can possibly be read.
Wyatt’s adaptation of Alamanni’s original may thus be read in terms of the
Machiavellian struggle of virtu versus fortuna, representing one man’s struggle against
those on whom fortune has conferred political power. While Wyatt deliberately retains
and uses Alamanni’s “fortuna” to question the basis of Henrician centralization in
England, he changes the metaphor Alamanni uses to represent power itself, reimagining it
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in a way that compels him to mount a more active resistance. Whereas Alamanni writes
that those wielding tyrannical power “hold the reins,” in Wyatt’s they “strike the stroke.”
The antagonists in Alamanni may curb the liberty of the individual, but the antagonists in
Wyatt’s poem are more pointedly described in terms of aggression and violence. Thus, he
cannot “cruelty to name/ Zeal of justice” (68-69). Donald Guss interprets this change as
meaning that Wyatt’s speaker has been “unjustly injured” and thus “retires with a
consciousness of his virtue.” But these changes do more than make a victim of the
speaker. They also suggest a situation more urgent than that found in Alamanni. More
than a man “whose honest simplicity has occasioned his downfall,”49 Wyatt’s speaker is
placed in a position requiring action. He cannot countenance what he sees at court, cannot
excuse “cruelty” as “Zeal of justice” (68-69). He therefore moves beyond simply
criticizing from a distance. The editorial decisions Wyatt makes in adapting Alamanni’s
original push the revision beyond protesting retirement to a kind of political analysis not
found in Alamanni’s original.
Wyatt’s purpose, though, is not simply to attack tyranny, but to avert tyranny in
the interest of rehabilitating the monarchy. In this respect, his purpose possesses a nuance
not found in Alamanni’s original. This sophistication is revealed in Wyatt’s change from
Brutus to Cato the Younger as a symbol of resistance. Alamanni’s speaker says he cannot
“honour with bright immortal praise Caesar and Sulla, condemning Brutus to be
wronged.” In stark contrast, Wyatt’s speaker cannot
… allow the state
Of him Caesar, and damn Cato to die,
That with his death did scape out of the gate
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From Caesar's hands (if Livy do not lie)
And would not live where liberty was lost;
So did his heart the common weal apply. (37-42)
A great deal of information about Cato the Younger circulated during the early modern
period, much of which resonates with both satires. Plutarch, for instance, writes that there
was “nothing youthful or refined” in Cato’s manner of speaking, that his speech was
“straightforward, full of matter, and rough, at the same time…there was a certain grace
about his rough statements.”50 Cato thus serves as a triumphant embodiment of the plain
speaking of the marginalized persona. Similarly, Cato was known throughout his lifetime
and posthumously as one who served principle rather than his own appetites. Biographies
abound that attest to Cato’s incorruptibility and resistance to bribery and while in office,
a revealing difference from Brutus, who as governor of Cyprus lent money at exorbitant
rates, prompting historian Peter Green to describe the idealistic Brutus as “a man of high
principle, and even higher interest.”51 In contrast to the unassailable reputation he affords
Cato, Plutarch records how Brutus “tasted of the benefit of Cesar's favor in any thing he
requested” to such an extent that he was urged to “beware of Caesar's sweet enticements,
and to fly his tyrannical favors: the which they said Caesar gave him, not to honor his
virtue, but to weaken his constant mind.”52 Given his unadorned manner of speaking and
his unassailable public record, it seems Cato is preferable to Brutus when choosing a
classical foil for the flattery and greed typifying the Renaissance court.
Moreover, the contrast between the relationships of Brutus and Cato to Caesar
reveals a deeper and more insightful reformative impulse on the part of Wyatt’s speaker.
Perez Zagorin argues that the switch was motivated by a sense of self-preservation on the
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part of Wyatt, who was understandably loath to sympathize with Brutus, a perceived
regicide. Jon Robinson counters that the poem’s being a translation would have been
adequate defense and thus does not explain the amendment. Following Elizabeth Heale’s
lead, Robinson attributes the change to Plutarch’s rendering of Cato as the “epitome of
upright honesty and plain speaking.”53 But beyond this, the resistances mounted by
Brutus and Cato against Caesar were fundamentally different. Both men fought against
Caesar’s forces at Pharsalus. But following Caesar’s victory, Brutus sued for and was
granted forgiveness. Cato, by contrast, retreated to Utica, there to commit suicide rather
than surrender. For this sacrifice, Roman historians beginning with Pliny the Elder
conferred upon him the cognomen “Uticensis,” an honor normally reserved for military
victors. Thus, even in the aftermath of the battle considered to mark the death of the
Republic, Cato displays a constancy and commitment to liberty not found in Brutus.
Of equal or greater significance is the source to which Wyatt attributes his
information regarding Cato. Wyatt’s qualifier “if Livy do not lie”— an addition without
cognate in Alamanni’s original—suggests that his source is the Roman author’s Ab Urbe
Condita Libri, a magisterial history of Rome from its mythical founding c. 753 BCE
through 9 BCE. However, by the sixteenth century, all but the first 45 books of the
original 142 books comprising Livy’s history had been lost to posterity. This means that,
for readers and writers during the Renaissance, Livy’s history essentially concluded at the
year 167 BCE, long before Cato’s death at Utica in 46 BCE. What may have served as
Wyatt’s actual source was the Periochae, an epitome of the last three quarters of Livy’s
history that had been compiled in fourth century. The summary of book 107 found in the
Periochae briefly notes that Cato opposed a law that would have allowed Caesar to hold
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the consulship in absentia, and the summary of book 114 relates how, following Caesar’s
military victory at Pharsalus and subsequent approach to Utica, “Cato… stabbed himself
and although his son intervened and tried to rescue him, he reopened the wound that was
being nursed, and died at the age of forty-eight.”54 But these excerpts illustrate that the
Periochae is little more than a table of contents, providing cursory details about Cato’s
life without contributing anything in the line of analysis. That is, nothing in the
epitomized Livy suggests the “liberty” or “common weal” that Wyatt uses Cato to
symbolize. It is therefore curious that Wyatt should allude to Livy instead of historians
such as Plutarch and Cassius Dio, both of whom comment on Cato’s moral rectitude and
commitment to liberty and would have been available to Wyatt. Perhaps it is not too
much to suggest that the allusion to Livy and to liberty in the line immediately
succeeding would serve as yet another indicator that Machiavelli’s ideas underpin the
political critique of this satire. Machiavelli’s Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio,
written sometime around 1517 and printed in 1531, was an attempt to “resurrect in the
spirit of young Italians Roman republican wisdom and virtue.”55 In it, Wyatt would have
found no mention of Cato. He would, however, have been exposed to Machiavelli’s
innovative ideas of fortune, virtu, and personal liberty as the touchstone of just
government.
By alluding to Cato and (indirectly) to Machiavelli, Wyatt’s speaker is claiming
an uncompromising devotion to personal liberty. Like Cato, he mounts a resistance even
in exile. Of course, while Wyatt’s speaker admires Cato’s uncompromising devotion, his
purpose in mentioning it is also to make clear that he cannot allow such things to happen.
It is not enough to die for liberty: one must live a resistance for the sake of the
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commonwealth. For this reason, he cannot “damn Cato to die” (38). The greatest service
one can do for the English commonwealth is not to effect a permanent retreat, but to
maintain one’s principles even if at some remove from the court. Wyatt’s choice of Cato
over Brutus is prudent in a self-preservative sense. But the prudence of the choice of Cato
also lies in the nature of Cato’s resistance to tyranny. Unlike Brutus (and Alamanni for
that matter), neither Cato nor Wyatt looks to personal violence as a way to safeguard
liberty. Brutus is remembered for the plot against Caesar, but Cato resisted Caesar long
before the fateful Ides, standing against the “new, self-serving legislation of Caesar’s.”56
Both men resisted Caesar in the senate house. But where Brutus did so with a dagger,
Cato used the toga. Susan Bridgen writes that “Like others of the classically educated at
Henry VIII's court, Wyatt thought on the nature of monarchy, and of tyranny, and he
wrote about it, despite the dangers. But there was always an ambivalence in him.”57
Wyatt couldn’t possibly align himself with a regicide, nor could he accept death as the
only honorable alternative to servitude. Far from advocating the regicide of Brutus or the
withdrawal of Alamanni, Wyatt seeks to reform the monarchy. But since direct counsel to
the monarch no longer seems viable, he must explore other options, a situation that
Arthur Ferguson describes as “rais[ing] the problem of counsel…from truth-telling to that
of intellectual citizenship.”58 Having described the corruption and tyranny of the court,
Wyatt’s speaker defines his present circumstances in ways that suggest a kind of political
activity among subjects outside of conventional channels.
While Wyatt uses the figure of Cato to evoke the twin ideas of withdrawal and
resistance, his refusal to endorse Cato’s death shows that he is searching for a solution to
problem of tyranny that is more practical than Cato’s symbolic (albeit profound) gesture.
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Wyatt cannot “damn Cato to die,” and unlike Cato he will not “with his [own] death…
scape out of the gate.” Ultimately, Wyatt’s satire proposes political discourse outside of
Court as a corrective to the problem of Henrician centralization. This is evidenced by the
striking changes he makes to Alamanni’s poem, which concludes with the speaker
indiscriminately castigating all about him:
Although the locals are full of malice, their evil efforts are kept within
bounds by their ignorance and fear. Much as they are for ever bursting
with hatred and envy of their betters, their wicked plots are frustrated by
their shortsightedness. So here I dwell in solitude with my Muses,
mocking the yokels’ lack of wit and slow desires. Henceforth the courts of
the great and their palaces will not see me crowding in among their
followers. Greed and envy will take no tribute, will not triumph over me. I
shall know true peace of mind.
Wyatt, by contrast, makes no mention of the locals in Kent. This is a meaningful
omission, as it allows him to avoid the Juvenalian spleen with which Alamanni
concludes. This is because Wyatt is doing much more than simply shaming those who
fail meet his standards. His criticisms of the courtiers are only a point of departure for a
political comment of greater significance. The speaker explains:
I am not now in France to judge the wine,
With saffry sauce the delicates to feel;
Nor yet in Spain, where one must him incline
Rather than to be, outwardly to seem:
I meddle not with wits that be so fine.

41
Nor Flanders' cheer letteth not my sight to deem
Of black and white; nor taketh my wit away
With beastliness; they beasts do so esteem.
Nor I am not where Christ is given in prey
For money, poison, and treason at Rome [.] (89-98)
Up to this point, the speaker seems to have been limiting his criticism to the English
court. But near the very end of the poem, the speaker censures France, Spain, Flanders,
and Rome, all of which by this time shared a court culture similar to that of England. The
speaker caricatures each of these courts according to the vices that were popularly
thought to characterize them. In another context, such stereotypes would be used in a
chauvinistic effort to define the contours of his own inchoate national identity against
those of less ethical, moral, incontinent, sober, or restrained character. Indeed, this
became a fairly typical satiric treatment of other lands as a sense of nationalism increased
in England and throughout Europe in general: the need to identify oneself or one’s
country by distinguishing it from others. However, the vices that typify these foreign
courts are in fact the same ones that the speaker seems to have attributed to the English
court: greed, dissimulation, incontinence. The inclusion of foreign courts clarifies the
actual target of the satire. It is not merely the English courtier, but the court itself. As
David Starkey notes that in the early sixteenth century, the courts of kings and princes
were not only politically dominant in northern Europe but were appearing in Italy as well.
In the early part of the sixteenth century, European courts were undergoing a process of
homogenization.59 Household reform, first in France in 1515 and soon after in England
and the Hapsburg Empire, led to more streamlined, efficient, and centralized mode of
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governance. The target is not simply one court or another, but a European court culture
that is assuming a more absolutist character.
By expanding the purview of the poem to include all of Europe, Wyatt undercuts
the legitimacy of courts in general, which is contrasted all the more starkly with his own
location “in Kent and Christendom” (100). His sojourn in Kent, whether rustication or
retreat, suddenly becomes not only morally but politically and theologically preferable.
Wyatt’s county seat is a foil to the court, an alternative location, characterized as the
antithesis of court. Furthermore, his alliterative zeugma of Kent with Christendom invites
us to see the two locations, one literal/local, one figurative/corporate, as in a sense
coterminous. There is the suggestion that the two do not simply overlap, they are in a
sense identical with one another. Wyatt is not banished from the only site of sovereignty.
Given the centrality of religious considerations to Henry VIII’s recent expansion in
prerogative, the speaker’s claim to a piece of Christendom suggests a degree of
autonomy, be it ever so humble. The synecdoche of Kent and Christendom allows for
both equivalence and difference. This, in itself, is a challenge to the perceived tyranny of
the Henrician supremacy, in which all political power and theological authority is
concentrated in one man, and where one’s political efficacy depends wholly on one’s
proximity to that center of power.
The suggestion of this alternative jurisdiction is rounded out by the speaker’s
invitation: “if thou list, my Poinz, for to come/ Thou shalt be judge how I do spend my
time” (102-03). Wyatt’s invitation to Poins marks another important divergence from
Alamanni’s original, in which the speaker concludes with a misanthropic, if not
solipsistic, intention to “dwell in solitude with [his] muses.” Just as Kent provides a
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spatial counterbalance to the court, the invitation to Poins provides a moral offset to the
dishonesty of the courtiers and despotism. By locating his speaker in Kent, Wyatt divests
his speaker of the fatalism in Alamanni’s original. Whereas Alamanni’s speaker has been
banished to Provence—much like Cato was pursued by Caesar to Utica—Wyatt’s
speaker has withdrawn to his ancestral home in the southeast of England. Having equated
corrupt English courtiers with corrupt courtiers of France, Spain, Flanders, and Rome,
Wyatt’s speaker now issues an invitation to Poins, a fellow Member of Parliament, to join
him where “in lusty leas at liberty [he] walk[s]” (84).
If the bulk of the satire comprises the efforts of unethical courtiers to elude
exposure and the inability of their client to see through their dissimulation, Wyatt’s
invitation to Poins promises the transparency required for the humanist program to
function: the purpose of the visit will be for Poins to “judge” what Wyatt has been doing.
If Wyatt has in fact left court to “set a law,” which I argue refers to the constitution of the
commonwealth, an invitation to a fellow MP who, it has been suggested, opposed certain
Henrician legal reforms, to join him and “judge” the fruits of his labor carries with it a
distinct political valence. In his description of tyranny, Aristotle notes two things the
tyrant must guard against if he us to maintain power:
[H]e must prohibit literary assemblies or other meetings for discussion,
and he must take every means to prevent people from knowing one
another (for acquaintance begets mutual confidence.) Further, he must
compel the inhabitants to appear in public and live at his gates; then he
will know what they are doing; if they are always kept under, they will
learn to be humble.60
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By withdrawing to Kent and inviting Poins to join him there, Wyatt puts into action
precisely those measures that Aristotle writes pose a threat to tyranny. Wyatt’s
withdrawal and invitation are centrifugal countermeasures to the centralization of power
at Court and far more politically constructive than previously recognized.
Wyatt’s invitation to Poins is a significant departure from Alamanni’s fatalistic
conclusion. Alamanni despairs, tacitly accepting Aristotle’s notion that a “tyrant is not
overthrown until men begin to have confidence in one another,”61 but finding nothing but
dissimulation at court and idiocy in the country. Wyatt, on the other hand, does what little
he can do to resist the defects of the Henrician court. While both Alamanni and Wyatt
withdraw from the deceit and tyranny of court, Wyatt’s adaptation demonstrates a
reformative impulse. A monarchist and conservative with an abiding concern for the
health of the commonwealth, Wyatt adopts a more prudent approach to the problem of
tyranny than does Alamanni. Rather than Brutus’s bloody and ethically ambiguous
mutiny, Wyatt prefers Cato’s slow, morally unassailable, prudent, and legal opposition to
despotism. However, Wyatt’s speaker is fully satisfied neither by Cato’s surrender—be it
ever so honorable and self-sacrificing—nor by Alamanni’s retreat—be it ever so
caustically critical of the Court. Informed by Machiavelli’s philosophy of fortune and
virtue, and by Wyatt’s own personal experiences in the employ of the English crown,
Wyatt brings to his adaptation of Alamanni’s satire a greater degree of prudence and
sophistication when addressing the issue of personal liberty in an increasingly autocratic
state. Most importantly, “Mine Own John Poins” is a definitive example of how
sixteenth-century English satirists were using satire’s open-endedness and dialogism to
respond to the increasing political centralization of the early modern state.
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Chapter Two
“Not what I would, but what I am”: Ambiguity and Mutability in
George Gascoigne’s The Steele Glas

In the exordium of The Steele Glas, written in 1576, George Gascoigne strikes a
pose similar to that of Thomas Wyatt in “Mine Own John Poins.” The persona of each
poem is a victim of dissemblers and, consequently, at a remove from the center of power.
However, in the body of his satire, Gascoigne moves beyond Wyatt’s clear distinction
between the righteous and the wrongdoers. Adopting the mirror as a vehicle for satire
means that the persona cannot help but see himself. Drawn into the ambit of the genre,
Gascoigne’s speaker becomes, like the Horatian persona, a topic of critique. Gascoigne
encourages this, exaggerating his own failings so that he may dramatize his struggle to
overcome them. Paradoxically, it is his own moral culpability that authorizes his voice
and situates him within the context of the commonwealth in the mid-sixteenth century.
While contesting definitions of how exactly satire works abound, critics all agree
that satire moves beyond simple complaint. One way to more deeply understand this
difference between the two modes is to consider the empowered status of the satiric
voice. Beyond registering dissatisfaction or cataloguing shortcomings, the satirist aims to
correct social ills and must therefore establish a degree of authority through various
rhetorical strategies. In many cases, this involves the satirist setting himself apart from
the target of the satire. For instance, both Luigi Alamanni and Thomas Wyatt remove
themselves from Court and, by way of explaining their departure, attack the immorality
of the court culture. This moral high ground both grants them perspective on and protects
them from contamination by the corruption they are decrying. In The Steele Glas, George
Gascoigne makes a riskier gambit for moral authority. He paradoxically foregrounds his
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checkered past not merely to explain and then dismiss it, but to parlay it into moral
capital. His shortcomings paradoxically inform his criticisms and, ultimately, establish
his interest in the commonwealth. Significantly, interest here denotes not only a concern
for England’s moral condition, but a vested stake in its economic and political wellbeing.
While the general criticisms found in The Steele Glas situate it neatly within the estates
satire tradition, Gascoigne’s idiosyncratic voice pushes the boundaries of 16th century
satire, expanding our understanding of it to include a speaker who is implicated in the
current state of affairs and, precisely because of this, has a right and moral imperative to
assert his opinion of them.
Beyond merely harkening back to a traditional poetic form, in The Steele Glas
Gascoigne uses elements of ambiguity and irony implicit in satire to address topics
distinctive to his own historical situation. However, to date, critical attention of The
Steele Glas has neglected this, instead focusing largely on either the novelty of its
prosody or the lack of originality in its worldview. Throughout the 20th and into the 21st
century, The Steele Glas has most often been cited for the novelty of being the first
English nondramatic poem written in blank verse.1 But critical discussion of the poem
has rarely gone beyond its formal innovation, with too few critics crediting Gascoigne’s
use of the form to comment on mid-16th century political issues such as foreign policy
and, more importantly, the issue of self-representation at court. C.S. Lewis famously
maintained that the poem is “medieval in everything but metre.”2 Stanley Maveety
contests Lewis’s qualification by showing how Gascoigne’s use of caesura, his
eschewing of enjambment, and the interplay of accent and alliteration actually disclose a
heavy medieval metrical influence.3 Similarly, Joan Grudy dismisses the significance of
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the poem’s wealth of classical allusions with her assertion that “the poem's classicism
goes nevertheless merely skin deep, and its strongest affinities are clearly with
Langland,”4 the author of the fourteenth-century estates satire Piers Plowman.
The problem with these assessments of The Steele Glas is not that they trace its
medieval generic antecedents. Indeed, structurally, The Steele Glas is easily seen to meet
the four identifying criteria of medieval estates satire as laid out by Ruth Mohl: an
apparently exhaustive listing of social and occupational groups; the belief that these
sundry classes and occupations comprise a divinely ordained, three-estate social structure
and that stability depends on the fulfillment of duties by all three; a decrying of the
historical failings of each estate; and an attempt to remedy the shortcomings of each
estate.5 Nor are the critical comparisons drawn between The Steele Glas and Piers
Plowman in any way implausible. Langland’s estates satire was arguably “the first
English poem to attain a national readership and influence while its author lived.”6
Editions were printed by Robert Crowley in 1550 and by Owen Rogers in 1561.
Gascoigne makes clear his awareness of Langland’s poem by numerous references at the
conclusion of The Steele Glas:
Stand forth good Peerce, thou plowman by thy name (1017)
stand forth Peerce plowman first (1035)
I see you Peerce, my glasse was lately scowrde (1042)
pray you to God for Peerce, / As Peerce can pinch, it out for him and you.
(1049-50.)
The problem is that early 20th-century assessments underestimated the reformist
tendencies of Langland’s text, and more recent revisionist criticism has not yet been
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extended to criticism of The Steele Glas. One example of early 20th-century
traditionalism is C.S. Lewis, who held that “Langland has nothing to propose except that
all estates should do their duty.”7 Similarly, E. Talbot Donaldson described Langland as a
“political moderate... [whose] political thought was conservative and traditionalist.”8
More recent scholarship has sought to revise this “counterprogressive model.”9 For
instance, Larry Scanlon has argued that medieval studies during the mid-20th century
“underestimated a radical strain of vernacular thought within its own period.”10 In an
effort to correct this, Scanlon suggests that Piers Plowman was not altogether
misappropriated by the Peasants Revolt of 1381 and explicates the poem to reveal a
“national vision, a vision of the nation’s center from its periphery”11 and a “radically
communal notion of political sovereignty.”12 Similarly, D. Vance Smith considers how
Piers Plowman “traces and accommodates the crucially unstable mercantile
subject…without falling prey to a nationalist symbolics based on the atavistic model of
the three estates.”13 Scanlon and Smith credit Langland and his readers with a greater
degree of political awareness and activity than earlier critics who ascribed to the
fourteenth century a static worldview and quietist social philosophy. Surprisingly, this
well-established correction to our reading of Langland’s poem has yet to penetrate our
understanding of Gascoigne’s estates satire, despite its having been written almost two
centuries later. Recent scholarship continues to interpret The Steele Glas as backward
looking rather than explicating the immediacy of its comment on contemporary political
and social issues. For instance, Laurie Shannon dismisses The Steele Glas as an “estates
satire in the vein of Piers Plowman, [which] attacks and laments a world of bad faith and
corruption… in quite traditional and generic Christian terms.”14 Gillian Austen concurs
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that The Steele Glas is “thoroughly medieval”15 and locates its “revolutionary aspect” in
its prosody. Austen mentions only briefly that it appears “carefully tailored”16 to accord
with the military interests of its dedicatee, Lord Grey.
There is a need for criticism of The Steele Glas to be afforded the same kind of
revision that has been granted criticism of Langland’s Pier Plowman. While the
interpretations of Scanlon, Smith, and others have largely revised the conservative and
moralistic interpretations to which Piers Plowman was reduced for much of the twentieth
century, to date no similar reassessment of The Steele Glas has been carried out. It seems
that critical approaches to Gascoigne’s satire accord with Ruth Mohl’s assessment that it
“might have been written in the time of Langland and Gower”17 without incorporating
more recent critical sensitivity to the nuances and dynamism of medieval texts. That is,
the “deeper historical gaze”18 that scholars have recently trained on medieval estates
satire has not yet been turned to its 16th-century counterpart. While medievalists have
revised their opinion of Piers Plowman, early modern critics still seem to accept that The
Steele Glas is premised on a static medieval vision of an ideal society. One way to
address this critical lacuna, and to expand our conception of Renaissance satire at large, is
to consider how Gascoigne adapts Ovid’s story of Philomela and uses it as exordium to
The Steele Glas. The Steele Glas then becomes a clear example of how early modern
writers retooled classical materials, grafting them onto their own native literary tradition
to understand and address specific historical situations. Considering Gascoigne’s
innovative use of source material reveals two things: First, his adaptation of Philomela
allows him to address his personal interests, ambitions, and anxieties within the highly
competitive patronage system associated with the Court. Second, and more broadly, it
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enables the articulation of a satire more morally complex than that typified by medieval
estates satire. Gascoigne’s use of Ovidian metamorphosis, comprising as it does the
concepts of twinning and change, counters the monolithic and static ideal of society
typically evoked in earlier assessments of both medieval estates satire and The Steele
Glas itself. Thus, The Steele Glas is a key text for considering how English writers were
using satire to articulate an understanding of political and economic change in the midTudor period.
Before turning to The Steele Glas, I want to discuss briefly the environment in
which Gascoigne began his writing career, as it helps to establish how he and his
immediate contemporaries viewed the intersection of politics and literature. Gascoigne
wrote his earliest extant work while a member of Grey’s Inn during the 1560s. During
this period, the Inns of Court were the “hub of literary activity”19 in London, a
professional community in which the functionaries of the burgeoning Elizabethan
bureaucracy were trained in law. While not part of a formal curriculum, the practices of
translation and composition contributed to the formation of an “extended network of
quasi-corporate authorship”20 at the Inns.21 Laurie Shannon contends that the conventions
of translation, pastoral, and epistolary verse observed by members of the Inns
demonstrate an awareness of horizontal relations based on collective intellectual activity
rather than vertical relations based on patronage and service, and that the imagined
community they engendered informed “emerging paradigms of nationhood”22 during the
1560s. In her examination of nine of Seneca’s tragedies translated at the Inns during the
1560s, Jessica Winston concludes that, more than literary exercises, the translations
suggest “personal interactions, and political thinking and involvement.”23 The literary
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precedents set by Inns of Court writers encouraged Gascoigne’s mindfulness of how
various literary forms could comment on immediate social and political issues.
Gascoigne opens The Steele Glas with an exordium based on the classical myth of
Philomela, adapted from Book 6 of Ovid’s Metamorphoses. In the original narrative,
Philomela is raped and imprisoned by her brother-in-law, Tereus, who then cuts out her
tongue so that she cannot divulge his crime. However, by weaving the story of the crime
into a tapestry, Philomela reveals the truth to her sister, Procne. The two women exact
vengeance by murdering Itys, Procne’s young son by Tereus, cooking him and serving
him to his father. Enraged, Tereus pursues the two women, who turn to the gods for
deliverance. Ovid’s tale ends with each of the three being transformed into a species of
bird: Tereus a hoopoe, Procne a swallow, Philomela a nightingale.
Gascoigne makes substantive changes to Ovid’s original plot. In The Steele Glas,
there is no mention made of violent female retribution. Gascoigne sticks to the Ovidian
script when he relates the wooing and marriage of Procne by Tereus, Procne’s longing for
her sister’s company, Tereus’s journey to fetch Philomene and his subsequent rape of her,
but he makes a curious move by jumping directly to Philomene’s metamorphosis, eliding
the conspiracy of the sisters and omitting the retaliatory infanticide and cannibalism
found in Ovid. As a result, the tale of moral equivalencies found in Metamorphoses, in
which the crime of Tereus is answered by the crimes of the sisters, becomes in The Steele
Glas a much more one-sided tale of power and victimization.
The thematic implications of these plot excisions become clearer as Gascoigne
applies an allegorical overlay to what remains of the original Ovidian framework. On one
level, this allegory is informed by Gascoigne’s literary theory. Procne becomes Poesys,
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who is “pleasant” (60), with a face “louely to beholde” (67), and Philomene becomes
Satyra, characterized by her plainness of speech. Already Gascoigne is broaching the
subject that underlies The Steele Glas: the difference between glittering appearances and
stark reality. But, as yet, there is no moral valence to this generic difference. Both poetry
and satire, being the offspring of “Playne dealyng” and “Simplycitie,” bring no harm to
anyone. Moreover, their relationship is not a simple binary; it is complementary rather
than oppositional. Poesys and Satyra are “twinnes at one selfe burden borne,” and Poesys
sometimes turns to Satyra for relief. Trapped in an unhappy marriage, seeing herself “so
matchte” (102), Poesys pines for her sister, whose “companye might comfort hir
sometimes,/ And sound advice might ease hir wearie thoughtes” (105-106). Thus, there is
a supportive relationship between poetry and satire, a consanguinity that extends to
congeniality.
There are, of course, differences between the sisters and between the genres they
represent, and these come to the fore in their respective dealings with vayne Delight, a
“stately man” (63) and “Galant” (78) who personifies both the allure and the hazard of
life at Court. Poesys, wooed because she is the more beautiful of the two sisters, happily
marries Vayne Delight. Two possible reasons are given for her “free consent” (83). She is
either “Entyst… with glosse of gorgeous shewe,” or she is “persuaded by his peeres” (8586). She is misled in either case, whether by herself or others, and mistakes glittering
appearances for “constant loue” (87). Poesys can sometimes slip into superficiality and is
therefore more easily manipulated than her sister. Fooled by Vayne Delight, it takes her
“some yeeres” (91) to realize her mistake. She responds to this truth with passivity,
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languishing in her bower and “mourn[ing] dayes and nights/ To see hir selfe…so
deceived” (100-102).
In contrast, Satyra demonstrates an agency not seen in Poesys by flying to her
side “euen at hir first request” (97). En route, she attracts the attention of vayne Delight
not because she is fair, but because she is alone, “on seas ful farre from friendly help”
(104). There is something unpolished about her clearing her throat and striving to sing
her best, and this combination of vulnerability and homeliness kindle the “sparke of lust”
within her brother-in-law (105-108). In the aftermath of Vayne Delight’s rape of her, she
evinces a constancy wanting in her sister, refusing to be either enticed or persuaded to
remain silent. Even imprisonment cannot lure her “simple mynde, from tracke of trustie
truth” (118). Ultimately, Vayne Delight resorts to cutting out Satyra’s tongue with the
“Raysor of Restraynte,/ Least [she] should wraye, this bloudy deede of his” (126-28).
But, even then, she continues with the
stumps of [her] reproued tong,
[to] Reprouers deedes reproue,
And sing a verse to make them see. [136-38]
This is an important departure from Ovid, in which Philomela sings to assuage the pain of
the wrongs visited on her by Tereus and the pain of her own guilt. Gascoigne’s
Philomene sings because she is constitutionally unable to depart from the truth.
The sisters’ interactions with Vayne Delight bring into focus the workings and
limitations of the respective genres they represent, showing how poetry and satire can be
subject to the caprice of power, which is by turns alluring and violent, and nearly always,
it would seem, acquisitive and opportunistic. On a more personal level, Gascoigne’s
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allegory corresponds to his experience as aspiring poet, caught in the intersection of
literature and power. Gascoigne is at different times each sister in the story. Like
Procne/Poesys, Gascoigne was “Entyst… with glosse of gorgeous shewe” (85) of court,
and his career is often viewed as a string of frustrated attempts to establish himself as a
court poet or secure the backing of a noble patron. These difficulties also reveal his
affinity with Philomene/Satyra. An abortive term in Parliament was fraught with legal
trouble, and despite a sound reputation among his fellow authors, his reputation suffered
from accusations of immorality levelled at his Poesies, particularly the prosimetric The
Adventures of Master F.J., which both interrogates and participates in the tradition of
erotic Petrarchan poetry. Gascoigne uses the figure of Philomene to show how he too has
contended with the Court’s “comely crewe of guylefull wights,” including “False
semblant,” “Detraction and Deceite,” and “False witnesse.” Perhaps the most compelling
kinship between Gascoigne and Satyra is found in how they are both wronged and
subsequently blamed for bringing it upon themselves. Satyra relates how, after she is
raped by Vayne Delight, he orders his courtiers to first inveigle and then blame her for
the assault:
He causde straight wayes, the formost of his crew
With his compeare, to trie me with their tongues:
And when their guiles, could not preuaile to winne
My simple mynde, from tracke of trustie truth,
Nor yet deceyt could bleare mine eyes through fraud,
Came Slander then, accusing me, and sayde,
That I entist Delyght, to loue and luste. (115-21)
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Gascoigne thus uses Satyra to symbolize his own innocence, victimization, and
undeserved censure. While his “harmelesse hart, perceivde not their deceipt” (43), his
detractors have attacked and despoiled his reputation. In a direct address to his patron,
Lord Grey, Gascoigne explains how to interpret correctly the Ovidian allusion:
But that my Lord, may playnely vnderstand,
The mysteries, of all that I do meane,
I am not he whom slaunderous tongues haue tolde [.] (44-46)
Like Philomene, Gascoigne is the victim, his honor besmirched, and Grey’s patronage to
him would be not only charitable but just. Moreover, beyond a plea for patronage,
Gascoigne’s posture associates him with the Horatian tradition, marking him as a “foolish
victim”24 rather than as the railing satyr figure that will figure so prominently among
English satirists of the next generation. As the poem proceeds, Gascoigne will diagnose
rather than denounce.
Gascoigne’s extended allusion to Ovid, in creating a persona more vulnerable
than Wyatt’s, is innovative for several reasons. First, it predates Spenser’s eclogues of
1579, which John King, like many critics, argues mark the “infusion”25 of classicism into
the English satiric tradition. Second, Gascoigne adapts the Ovidian story to accord with
traditional satirical discourse, expressing its moral certainty and the defensive position it
offers the satirist. As the off-spring of “Playne dealyng” (56) and “Simplycitie” (57),
Satyra is unable to participate in the collusions of the Court. Similarly, Gascoigne himself
is no court poet, and he sings his songs
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…in corner closely cowcht
Like Philomene, since that the stately cowrts,
Are now no place, for such poore byrds[.] (142-44)
Like Thomas Wyatt’s in “Mine Own John Poins,” Gascoigne’s persona speaks from the
periphery. However, Satyra lacks the authority and choice of Wyatt’s speaker, which
doubtless reflects the different situations of the respective authors. Whereas Wyatt’s
speaker removes himself to Kent by choice, Philomene and Gascoigne are excluded by
those in power who would silence them. But in either case, this outsider status is not
without its virtues. It sets Gascoigne apart, as the satirist now is, from “euery ianglyng
byrd,/ Which squeaketh loude” (150-51), and enables him to offer to his patron
A rare conceit…
A trustie tune, from auncient clyffes conueyed,
A playne song note, which cannot warble well. (158-60)
Gascoigne suggests that The Steele Glas will make up in candor what it might lack in
embellishment.
Perhaps Gascoigne’s most significant innovation is his use of Philomene to
articulate and excuse his role as satirist. Through Philomene, Gascoigne can cast his
poem as a response to the disproportionate wrongs visited on him by his enemies. He is
compelled but powerless to retaliate against his assailants, and therefore his “teares must
venge [his] harms” (131). But, beyond providing defensive cover, the figure of
Philomene allows Gascoigne to begin developing the concept of discernment refined
through suffering, which will be central to his satire. Thus, Gascoigne opens The Steele

57
Glas with an invocation of Philomene, whose unforgettable pain confers upon her a
moral acuity:
O Phylomene, then helpe me now to chaunt:
And if dead beastes, or liuing byrdes haue ghosts,
Which can conceiue the cause of carefull mone,
When wrong triumphes, and right is ouertrodde,
Then helpe me now, O byrd of gentle bloud,
In barrayne verse, to tell a frutefull tale,
A tale (I meane) which may content the mindes
of learned men, and graue Philosophers. (18-25)
Gascoigne’s opening supplication to Philomene indicates his satiric intent. The poem’s
rhetorical purpose is not only to decry how “wrong triumphes, and right is ouertrodde”
(21), but to determine causality, to establish “the cause of carefull mone” (20), with a
view to correcting what is wrong. That his analysis is meant for “learned men, and graue
Philosophers” (25) suggests both a social and reformative impulse that is essentially
satiric. The author hopes that, “content” with the poem’s conclusions, such men (and,
presumably, women) will disseminate and apply them. To earn the acceptance of such
grave minds, Gascoigne draws a parallel between himself and Philomene so that he, too,
may use his troubled past to establish his credibility in the present.
Unlike the Roman satirist Juvenal, Gascoigne is not merely compelled to write his
satire by the vice he sees around him but also through his recognition of the faults within
himself. Like Philomene, he compels himself to sing by leaning against the thorn of
painful memory. The persona
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…sing[s], with pricke against [his] brest,
Like Philomene, since that the priuy worme,
Which makes [him] see [his] reckles youth mispent,
May well suffise, to keepe [him] waking still[.] (145-48)
Although Gascoigne refashions Philomene solely as victim, his readership would surely
have remembered that, in the popular and well-established source tale, she was also the
perpetrator of horrible crimes. Thus, the image of the thorn is richly ambivalent, drawing
from both iterations and evoking both her sadness and her guilt. Through this
ambivalence, Gascoigne unites his own failings with his victimization by others, an
ambiguity which is key to his satire. The twinning of his faults and his grievances
disabuses him of self-serving illusions, bestows a degree of moral acuity, an objectivity,
and thereby justifies his criticisms. In Ovid, Philomene’s metamorphosis is aesthetic,
enabling her to transmute tragedy into beauty. However, Gascoigne’s Philomela does
more than simply comfort herself through a process of artistic creation. She discomfits
other by showing them truths they might rather ignore.
In one sense, Philomene’s singing is an act of remorse, perhaps even of expiation.
In another sense, her song is an act of defiance. It should be remembered that Vayne
Delight initially woos Poesys in part because her “speeche [is] pleasant stil” (68),
connoting the quiet passivity of a silent woman who knows her place. By contrast,
Philomene sings despite Tereus’s escalating efforts to silence her. Like Philomene,
Gascoigne writes despite what “slaunderous tongues haue tolde” (46) about “the tales
deuised by [his] pen” (50). Per Sivefors argues that, in The Steele Glas, “the unbridled
tongue is inseparable from immoral behavior, and the poem makes the point that a
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functioning state is inconceivable if its language is licentious.”26 But Gascoigne uses the
figure of Philomene to show that, while licentiousness itself may be dishonorable, it can
at times bestow a kind of license upon those marked by it. Like the legendary Roman
matron Lucrece, Philomene is despoiled both literally and morally by her assailant.
Contaminated though she may be, however, the gods decree that she may sing of the
wrongs visited upon her. Thus, a kind of empowerment issues from her ignominy. By
invoking Philomene as his muse, Gascoigne suggests a parity between his own sullied
reputation and hers, participating in both her victimhood and her subsequent
empowerment. Paradoxically, it is the onus of a shameful reputation that enhances the
vision and empowers the voice of each of them.
To further align himself with Philomene, Gascoigne blurs the gender line that
separates them. Briefly but explicitly alluding to another Ovidian figure, he claims to be
“in dede a dame,/ Or at the least, a right Hermaphrodite” (52-53). He cannot, therefore,
be
the man, which ment a common spoyle
Of louing dames, whose eares wold heare my words
Or trust the tales deuised by my pen. (48-50)
Beyond a personal defense against detractors, the figure of the hermaphrodite embodies
the poem’s overall theme of metamorphosis. In The Steele Glas, metamorphosis is not
simply about changing from one thing to another, but about inhabiting the space in
between, retaining aspects of both the prodigal and the reformed. The figure of
Hermaphroditus embodies the central theme of doubleness. Gascoigne’s satire unfolds a
liminal space between absolute right and absolute wrong. In this way, The Steele Glas
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embraces an ambiguity not appreciated in earlier assessments. The doubleness of the
hermaphrodite is important in this respect.
Had Gascoigne stopped here, The Steele Glas might be classified as hybrid of
complaint and apologia. He has alluded to his past mistakes (albeit with some ambiguity
about whether they are real or alleged); he has questioned whether he justly deserves the
ill-treatment he has received at the hands of others; and he has justified his speaking
openly of them. But as he moves into the body of the estates satire, he complicates his
relationship to the figure of Philomene and foregrounds his internal struggles. Within the
logical framework he has established in his exordium, these past lapses and his present
handling of them model a process of rejuvenation that may be applied to the
commonwealth as a whole. Doing this pushes The Steele Glas beyond complaint into
satire, ultimately one more constructive than Juvenalian attack and more intense than
gentle Horatian ribbing.
One way Gascoigne segues from complaint to satire is by shuttling between the
personal and the political. In the body of The Steele Glas, the individual becomes a
microcosm of the commonwealth. His commentary on the behavior of others is
inextricably tied to his own behavior, his insight into their lapses somehow associated
with his own shortcomings. Initially, as he “mark[s] this weak and wretched world” (161)
seeking to determine “from whence such errour springs” (164), he is hampered by his
“weary wittes” (168), casualties of the “cannon shot, of much misgouernment” (170-71).
Gascoigne’s diction in this line works on multiple levels. In the most literal sense,
“cannon shot” calls to mind his military service in the Low Countries, foregrounding a
personal sacrifice that would recommend him to his militant patron, Lord Grey.
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Additionally, when we remember that “misgovernment” carried a distinctly personal
denotation during the period Gascoigne was writing, “cannon shot” becomes a metaphor
for indiscreet or incontinent personal behavior. Thus, the line is richly polysemic, deftly
weaving together success and failure, the personal and the political. Gascoigne juxtaposes
his military service and his personal faults to underscore the theme of stark,
unembellished knowledge emerging from harsh experience. It is because of his “battred
braynes” (170), not in spite of them, that Gascoigne is able to “spye…onely one conceite,
/ Which makes [him] thinke, the world goeth stil awry” (172-73). Divested of his own
delusions, Gascoigne can see how every person “yet deceiues himself” (163). He
understands that self-deception gives rise to “mistes of darke mistake” (165) and
concludes that commonwealths languish because their members prefer to be
Beguylde with Foyles, of sundry subtil sights,
So that they seeme, and couet not to be.
This is the cause (beleue me now my Lorde)
That Realmes do rewe, from high prosperity[.]
…
This is the cause (or else my Muze mistakes)
That things are thought, which neuer yet were wrought,
And castels buylt, aboue in lofty skies,
Which neuer yet, had good foundation. (192-213)
Gascoigne will continue to foreground both his service to the country and his perceived
failures in order to validate what his satiric voice has to say about the commonwealth,
exploiting the relationship between bitter experience and a consequent moral acuity.
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In the exordium, Gascoigne uses Philomene to represent his struggle with external
forces. Like Philomene, he has contended with his own crew of detractors, of “guileful
wights,” in and around Court. Now, in the body of the poem, he moves the struggle
inward, using the mirror to symbolize the tension between self-awareness and self-image.
The mirror is the precise interface between being and seeming, refining the idea of
doubleness suggested by the twinning of Poesys and Satyra and further emphasized by
the allusion to Hermaphroditus. Appealing to the gravitas of Lucilius, the Roman poet
reputed to have invented satire, Gascoigne describes the genre as a mirror of
…trustie Steele,
[which] came to [him], by wil and testament
Of one that was, a Glassemaker in deede. (225-27)
Rayna Kalas rightly notes that Gascoigne “chooses a mirror whose particular substance
will link the poetic mirror with the patriotic sword, and thus his career as a poet with his
career as a soldier.”27 But personalizing the genre also exposes a dissonance within
himself, one revealed to be of a piece with the commonwealth at large as the poem
unfolds. The martial figures of Caesar and Codrus embody the contrast between his
aspirations and his accomplishments. The speaker describes himself as having
A Cæsars minde, and yet a Codrus might,
A Souldiours hart, supprest with feareful doomes:
A Philosopher, foolishly fordone. (244-46)
Caesar’s military prowess was renowned. The allusion to Codrus requires some
explanation. A mythical king of Athens, Codrus learned of an oracle foretelling a Dorian
victory on the condition that the king of Athens—in this case himself—remain unharmed.
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Codrus therefore disguised himself as a peasant, infiltrated the Dorian camp, and revealed
himself. His ensuing death secured the safety of his city, in accordance with the oracle.
Codrus’s sacrifice may have been selfless, but certainly not an example of “might” in any
conventional sense. Gillian Austen, taking these lines at face value, reads them as
suggestive of Gascoigne’s humiliation over possessing “a less than ideal reputation as a
soldier and a poet.”28 But this overlooks the fact that Gascoigne’s poetic output was
admired by his peers and recognized by superiors as highly placed as the Earl of
Leicester, who employed him to not only design the Kenilworth entertainment but also
record it for posterity.29 Moreover, Gascoigne’s military reputation was noted by his
superiors, such as in a dispatch written in 1572 that lists “Mr. George Gascoigne” among
those who on July 28 “charged [the Spaniards] in the face with sordes and
targettes…[and] served valyauntly.”30 William of Orange repaid Gascoigne’s efforts
monetarily and with subsequent military commissions.31 Thus, his reputation as both
soldier and poet was sound. In fashioning his persona using details from his own life,
Gascoigne appears to have exaggerated the blemishes. Such self-effacement was a
rhetorical tactic common to Roman satirists and their imitators, shielding them from
accusations of self-righteousness or downright scurrility. In discussing the influence of
Horace’s Sermones on Donne’s satires, James S. Baumlin notes that “when the satirist
engages himself dramatically in the world of his satire, his words and his actions become
as open to scrutiny as those of his adversarius…. [T]he satirist’s own characterization,
with his likes, dislikes, strengths, and indeed weaknesses may be part of his poem’s
subject matter.”32 That Gascoigne grafts this classical practice to the native stock of
estates satire is itself significant, especially when we note that he did so decades before
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the flourishing of English formal verse satire, a conscious imitation of Roman satire, in
the 1590s.
Beyond a defensive rhetorical pose, however, the sheer emotional intensity of the
following lines demonstrates the aptness of the mirror as a metaphor for satire. Having
first taken up his steel glass as a kind of shield against the aspersions of others,
Gascoigne now finds that it inevitably leads to a painful self-examination. The plangent
imagery of Philomene’s maiming is echoed in the Gascoigne’s frustration with what the
steel glass reveals:
And to be playne, I see my selfe so playne,
And yet so much vnlike that most I seemde,
As were it not, that Reason ruleth me,
I should in rage, this face of mine deface,
And cast this corps, downe headlong in dispaire [.] (247-51)
Typically, these lines are read as Gascoigne’s attempt to recoup a tarnished reputation,
the kind of literary and social ambition amply addressed in the critical work of Richard
Helgerson and Susan Frye. But beyond the author’s mea culpa, the lines demonstrate the
unflinching diagnostic power of satire as Gascoigne understands it. In The Steele Glas,
not even the satirist himself is afforded a privileged position. Unlike “Mine Own John
Poins,” The Steele Glass offers no Archimedian point to which the poet can withdraw and
renders judgement on those around him; he is fully implicated.
Despite a professed desire to “let al seeming passe” (229), to dispense with
artificiality and confront reality, the persona struggles to reconcile his self-image and his
own reflection in the steel glass and is roused nearly to self-mutilation. The stark imagery
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of a corpse “cast…headlong in despaire” (251) moves the sentiment beyond the decorous
humility of an Elizabethan client writing for his patron. Beyond a rhetorical pose of the
author, this is a critical, albeit brief, moment of almost existential crisis for the satiric
persona. So despondent is he for having discovered a reflection “so farre vnlike it selfe”
(252), the speaker acknowledges the possibility of abandoning his virtuous enterprise to
“this face of [his] deface” (248), to strike out any reminder of failure. Reason alone keeps
him from mirroring Tereus, who visited a similar violence on Philomene and “did carue
hir pleasant tong, / To couer so, his owne foule filthy fault” (10-11), and from mirroring
Philomela, who helped to murder her nephew and serve his remains to his father.
More broadly, defacing the face in the steel glass would be a rejection of the
unembellished truth of satire, a retreat into the same self-deceit at the root of all the
commonwealth’s woes. Men wish to “seeme, and couet not to be” (191), and this, as the
persona has already told us, is the principal reason
That kings decline, from princely gouernment,
That Lords do lacke, their auncestors good wil,
That knights consume, their patrimonie still,
That gentlemen, do make the merchant rise,
That plowmen begge, and craftesmen cannot thriue,
That clergie quayles, and hath smal reuerence [.] (192-99)
The persona’s interaction with the steel glass establishes a pattern that recurs throughout
the remainder of the poem: a dialectical process whereby each social rank—prince,
knight, commoner, cleric—is first stripped of its pretensions and then redirected to more
ethical behavior. By dramatizing how one individual interacts with the satire, Gascoigne
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models how the entire commonwealth is to accept and employ his criticisms. He does not
dramatize his own experience merely to avoid arousing the hatred of his targets. Rather,
by including himself in the common problem, he reintegrates himself into the
commonwealth he anatomizes. The bird “closely couched” in the corner reemerges as a
moral example, not simply a moral arbiter at a remove from the community, but an active
participant both in its failures and in its regeneration. By continuing to look into the steel
glass, despite the difficulty of doing so, he discovers for himself and reveals to his reader
how intimately linked his personal struggle is to that of the commonwealth:
And therwithal, to comfort me againe,
I see a world, of worthy gouernment,
A common welth, with policy so rulde,
As neither lawes are sold, nor iustice bought,
Nor riches sought, vnlesse it be by right. (253-57)
Two considerations mark this episode as a focal point in the poem. First, the persona
finds this healing vision of a properly ruled commonwealth within the steel glass. Satire
does more than strip away the speaker’s self-serving delusions. Having done so, it also
offers the comfort of a sound moral alternative. Up to a certain point, this mirrors the
metamorphosis of Ovid’s Philomene, whose participation in a tragic narrative leads to the
creation of aesthetic beauty. Gascoigne’s satire, of course, goes further, adding a moral
valence to the metamorphosis. Gascoigne’s speaker is comforted not by simple beauty,
but by contemplation of “justice” and “right.” Satire in this instance is both diagnostic
and therapeutic. Second, the pain experienced by the persona on a personal level is
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assuaged not by a simple individual consideration but by the vision of a properly
functioning commonwealth, by his contemplation of
… foure estates, to serue eche country Soyle,
The King, the Knight, the Pesant, and the Priest.
The King should care for all the subiectes still,
The Knight should fight, for to defende the same,
The Peasant he, should labor for their ease,
And Priests shuld pray, for them and for themselues. (289-94)
The persona purges the residual pain of his pasts by ferreting out duplicity, rank by rank,
and then redirecting his and his readers’ attention to restorative models.
Gascoigne’s analysis of social ills delves deeply, recreating his struggle for
personal rejuvenation to model social renewal. Having established a pattern of diagnosis
and remedy, Gascoigne applies it to each estate in turn. Princes pursue pleasures “of little
worth in dede” (348); but Gascoigne’s “glasse, which is of trustie steele” (412), shows
plainly how “kingdomes breede but care” (413). Knights are urged to “[b]ehold [his]
glasse” (590-91) that they may “learne to liue, within thy bravries bounds” (623).
Included among the peasantry is “he that labors any kind of way. / To gather gaines, and
to enrich himself” (653). Too many of these “be blynde” (683), and so Gascoigne
positions his
Glasse… to shew,
Whereas long since, all [commoners] were seene
To be men made, out of another moulde. (694-96)
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Such a dialectic between what is and what should be is not, of course, an innovation of
Gascoigne’s. In discussing conventional mid-20th century theories of satire, Dustin
Griffin notes that just such a “bipolar praise-and-blame pattern is the formal core of a
satire.”33 But Gascoigne’s satire is more nuanced than this, suggesting as it does what
Griffin calls the “drama of an inflamed sensibility…. [A] working through… [of] the
implications of a given moral position.”34 While the exordium of The Steele Glas
contains the unambiguous moral certainty earlier critics expected of satire, the body of
the poem records a persona who writhes in the mesh of such moral certainty.
By dramatizing his own failings, his attempted reform, and his tendency to
backslide, Gascoigne establishes his bona fides as a speaker of truth. Thus, his insights
are “no feined dreame” (214), an explicit and significant departure from the flattering
untruths of Court poetry and, perhaps, an implicit but no less significant departure from
Langland’s Piers Plowman, which is almost wholly related as a number of medieval
dream visions.35 In his exordium he has woven his own history with the story of
Philomela, walking us through a personal narrative, from credulous victim to selfdeceiver to wielder of satire’s unforgiving but undeceiving mirror:
… a glasse of trustie Steele,
Wherein they may be bolde alwayes to looke,
Bycause it shewes, all things in their degree.
And since myselfe (now pride of youth is past)
Do loue to be, and let al seeming passe,
Since I desire, to see my selfe in deed,
Not what I would, but what I am or should [.] (225-31)
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The persona has undergone a metamorphosis of sorts, from aspiring court poet of
“reckles rimes” (27) to sober moral arbiter. Moreover, his moral struggle is a microcosm
of the political and economic struggles of the commonwealth, participating in the more
realistic, almost empirical approach favored by sixteenth-century English political
reformers. A marginal gloss reminds the reader that “He which wil rebuke mens faults,
shal do wel not to forget hys owne imperfections.” This moral commonplace takes on
new meaning in The Steele Glas, in which both Gascoigne’s version of the Philomene
story, his allusion to Hermaphroditus, and the steel glass itself all symbolize the
doubleness that counters earlier theories of satire based on unambiguous moral certainty.
In Gascoigne’s satire, double-ness is unavoidable. Although Gascoigne laments the
apparent gulf between being and seeming, satire itself is shown to comprise just such an
ambiguity. The ideal and the real exist side-by-side in the steel glass, and Gascoigne’s
own described experience suggests that reformation is a recursive process, a shuttling
back and forth among what we have been, what we are, and what we should be. This
mutability is especially remarkable in an estates satire, a sub-genre that traditionally
insisted on an almost schematic view of human society. Moreover, it suggests a
pragmatism perhaps overlooked in early modern satire, too often reduced by critics to
moral certainty. Gascoigne’s foregrounding of ambiguity and change in The Steele Glas
reflects the social analyses of political reformers in the sixteenth century, moving it away
from the strict hierarchy of the three-estates model to something more dynamic and only
vaguely understood.
That said, The Steele Glas is fundamentally conservative in its world view. Like
all estates satire, it targets a certain decadence throughout society, a condition of being
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out of step with preordained rhythms of a functioning commonwealth. Written by a
sometime court poet desperate for patronage, its normativity and insistent nostalgia for a
golden age could be labelled reactionary. What’s new here is the way the author positions
himself within his account of the commonwealth. The persona in The Steele Glas is, like
the speaker of “Mine Own John Poins,” at a spatial remove from the center of power.
But, unlike Wyatt’s speaker, Gascoigne’s persona is not morally different from those he
aims to correct. On the contrary, only because he personally has struggled against the
same self-serving delusions to which all social ills—civil unrest, unemployment, poverty,
price inflation, dislocation, crime—are secondary can he effectively speak to “the cause
of carefull mone” (20). Perhaps these disparate approaches reflect differences between
the authors’ social positions. A prominent courtier such as Wyatt would have the standing
and confidence to posit, however tentatively, an alternative space on the periphery to
counterbalance the corruption he sees at the center. Conversely, Gascoigne’s persona
implicates himself within the common condition precisely because he lacks an
established place. By establishing himself as an accomplice in sin and a collaborator in
duty, he cements both his moral and material interest in the commonwealth.
In a broader sense, The Steele Glas shows how early modern satire reflected
changing conceptions of commonwealth during the second half of the sixteenth century.
The story of Philomene allows Gascoigne to address the instability inherent in the estates
social model, despite its quest for perpetual stasis, and incorporates into the genre the
kind of analysis and dynamism that mark the political reformers of the sixteenth century
as fundamentally different than their predecessors. Gascoigne’s body politic comprises
more than just heroes and villains. By integrating the facets of his own checkered past
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and present, Gascoigne incorporates himself into a new moral economy in which each
member is in some sense both victimized and culpable, an inevitability in a system of
interdependent and conflicting interests.
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Chapter Three
“How dares the lamb be so bold with the lion?”: Parody and Porosity of Political
Roles in Thomas Deloney’s Jack of Newbury
In chapter three of Thomas Deloney’s 1597 prose romance Jack of Newbury, the
eponymous weaver Jack Winchcombe stages a scene along the parade route of Henry
VIII, who is on progress through Berkshire. Dressing thirty of his household servants in
silken finery and arming them with swords and bucklers, Jack directs the men to assume
a defensive posture atop a large anthill and takes his place among them to await the
passing royal entourage. The King, naturally curious, stays his progress and sends his
herald to ask the meaning of this strange spectacle. Jack responds that he is “poor Jack of
Newbury… chosen Prince of Ants…to defend and keep these my poor and painful
subjects, from the force of the idle butterflies, their sworn enemies, lest they should
disturb this quiet Common-wealth.”1 Learning of this response, the amused King again
dispatches his herald to summon this “pleasant fellow” to approach the royal person. Jack
cheekily replies to the astonished herald “His Grace hath a horse and I am on foot,
therefore will him to come to me.”2 This is, in fact, precisely what the Henry does, and in
their subsequent exchange Jack develops further his allegory for the King, explaining that
this “most provident Nation of the Ants” has suffered under the Grasshopper, the
Caterpillar, and the Butterfly, who are proud, ambitious, and “not only idle, but also
[live] upon the labors of other men.”3 Jack’s allegory raises the issue of competing
interests within the commonwealth and the role of political power in regulating conflicts
arising from such competition. By parodying the language and practices of the ruling
elite, Jack insinuates his voice into an emerging discourse of political economy,
simultaneously critiquing his monarch and demonstrating an affinity with him. Deloney’s
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use of open-ended, dialogic satire allows him to tender practical (if pointed) criticism
without resorting to simple and reductive condemnations.
Many critics have overlooked the topical import of this episode and read it solely
in terms of the period depicted in the narrative, in this case the 1520s. Thus, Jack’s
complaint of “proud Butterflies” is dismissed as a gibe at Cardinal Wolsey, a by-word for
the opportunistic counsellor who perverts the rule of an otherwise just and congenial
sovereign. For instance, F.O. Mann interprets the “parable of the Anthill…[as] directed at
Wolsey…[and] the great subsidy of one-fifth of all goods.”4 Paul Salzman claims that the
allegory is an “attack on Cardinal Wolsey, especially on his extortionary taxes.”5 Alex
Davis, too, argues that “once again, Wolsey is the target.”6 Even David J. Morrow, who
recognizes that Deloney’s historical fiction is “characterized by hardships redolent of the
1590s,” sees Wolsey, rather than the King, as the target of Jack’s satire.7 These reading
are justified to some extent. Taken as whole, Jack of Newbury certainly participates in a
discourse of “body politic” theory, according to which a symbiotic and reciprocal
relationship exists between king and commoner, a relationship that is threatened by the
grasping policies of the ruthless courtier. But by overlooking events of the years
immediately preceding and following the publishing of Jack of Newbury, critics run the
risk of reducing the episode to a case of naïve monarchism that effectively immunizes the
monarch from any culpability. I would submit that the true target of Jack’s Allegory of
the Ants is, in fact, the King himself. The complexity of Deloney’s satire emerges when
the episode is read beside current debates over royal prerogative and the granting of
monopolies during the 1590s. Deloney’s satire can then be seen as part of a larger change
in economic discourse that occurred during the sixteenth century. Like participants in this
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new mode of economic discourse, Deloney is not concerned with overarching ideals or
general principles. Rather, his satire looks to immediate historical circumstances to
ground his critique of the social repercussions of government’s economic role in the
commonwealth. Ultimately, Deloney’s satire advances a conception of the
commonwealth that differentiates between the government and the state.
By the 1590s, the relationship between economics and government policy was
being written about in ways vastly different from those at the close of the previous
century. An awareness of the social function of economic mechanisms in daily life was,
of course, not lacking prior to the sixteenth century. But, as Arthur Ferguson writes,
while the “articulate Englishman of the later Middle Ages” was becoming increasingly
aware of a causal relationship between economics and society, the expression of this
awareness was restrained by a “view of public life…limited by the fixed horizons of a
prescribed moral order and a providential history.”8 This universalist and religious
worldview prevalent at the close of the fifteenth century largely restricted economic
discourse to modes of complaint and moral exhortation and precluded such discourse
from advancing to analysis and discussion of policy. In contrast, by the mid-sixteenth
century, English writers trying to understand the civil uprisings and “dearth” of their own
day began to discuss the commonwealth not as an “organism governed by universal
principles,” but as an “economic mechanism impelled by particular, often variable forces,
natural in origin and observable, impersonal and amoral, yet subject to the intelligent
direction of human agencies.”9 The new secularism was fostered by the advent of the
humanist movement: the discovery, translation, and study of classical texts, which
provided writers with analytical models that might be applied to contemporary issues and
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problems. For sixteenth-century English humanists, the Roman stoics provided the
“primary source of inspiration”10 in the formation of a new vocabulary of political
activity. Foremost among these classical authors in the first half of the sixteenth-century
was the orator and statesman Cicero, whose De Officiis was translated into English by
Robert Wittington in 1534 as an aid to understanding the “increase of commen welthes
[and the] cause of [their] ruyne and decaye.”11 This use of classical texts to understand
and discuss politics was more than an academic exercise for English humanists. Cicero’s
exhortation to join otium (learning) to negotium (daily business) justified the English
humanist in conceiving of himself as a reformer, a “citizen rather than merely as a
sage.”12 Encouraged by the Ciceronian doctrine of the vita activa, political activity within
English humanist discourse became idealized as a “noble exchange of views by leading
scholars and humanistically educated courtiers for the purpose of educating the
monarch.”13
However, when it came to economic questions, English humanists during the first
half of the sixteenth century encountered problems in trying to reconcile their own
historical circum- stances with the counsel they drew from their classical sources.
Typically, economic issues were not treated in their own right in Greek and Roman
writers, being instead subordinated under ethical and political categories. Because they
“took for granted the basic ethical and political origins of classical discussions of
commerce,”14 early-modern English economic commentators needed carefully to
distinguish their own commercial endeavors and economic reforms from the excessive
pursuit of profit and “wealth-getting” condemned in classical sources such as Aristotle’s
Politics. One way of doing this was by discussing economics in terms of the financial
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health of the commonwealth as a whole. For example, in A Discourse of this
Commonweal of England, Thomas Smith explores the nature, purpose, extent, and
responsibilities of government with a view to diagnosing and remedying social ills of the
years immediately preceding 1549. Smith’s treatise is an intersection of political
philosophy and economics in which neither discourse is privileged. Smith sees the
economic and political domains as intersecting, forming a nexus “touching everything
and everyone, [in which] economy becomes more than simply a means of achieving
political coherence but promotes a reimagination of the political relation itself.”15
However, this optimism of Ciceronian humanism soured as the Continental wars
of the sixteenth century rendered untenable any notion of a single unifying morality and
“sharpened the perception of contemporaries about what kind of politics was necessary in
the modern world.”16 According to Richard Tuck, by the 1570s the Ciceronian ideal of a
commonwealth administered through rational discourse—typified, for example, in
Smith’s Discourse— gave way to what Tuck has termed the new humanism, which
incorporated the language of “ethical skepticism” and “principles of self-interest and selfpreservation.”17 Inspired by Tacitus, among Roman writers the most “sceptical and
disenchanted commentator on political events,”18 and contemporary writers such as
Machiavelli, Guicciardini, Lipsius, and Montaigne, the new humanism dispensed with a
Ciceronian ideal that it saw as “lofty yet forlorn.”19 Rather than view politics as a moral,
collective enterprise, Tacitean discourse recognized that “politics must usually be
understood in terms of the interplay of interests.”20 This shift from a Ciceronian moralism
to a Tacitean realism(?) is illustrated by Sir Henry Savile’s 1591 English translation of
Tacitus’s Historiae, in which Nero is subjected to a “novel criteria: to see him in a
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primarily political, as opposed to moral, perspective.”21 Peter Burke writes that the appeal
of Tacitus for late sixteenth-century humanists was his practice of “discussing men as
they really are, not as they ought to be.”22 For many political commentators during the
late sixteenth century, Tacitus’s pragmatic account of “the ubiquity and ineluctability of
princely wrong doings”23 appeared more applicable to their own situation than did a
slightly outmoded Ciceronian moralism.
This “taste for realism in analysis”24 extended to English economic reformers of
the later sixteenth century, who saw the sources of public revolt to be not moral but
political and economic. Often, the matter of contention was the perception that one party
was drawing private profit at the public’s expense.25 Such was the case with the
monopoly debates that began during the Parliament of 1574 and reached a critical
juncture by the late 1590s. John Guy has argued that these years witnessed “a
fundamental reconstruction of royal patronage,”26 signaled by a switch from land leases
to monopolies as the primary source of compensating courtiers. The Crown’s granting of
such concessions was perceived by Parliament as “shifting the costs of such rewards from
the crown to the commonwealth,”27 and led to a series of hotly contested debates in 1597
and 1601, the “ugliest parliamentary scenes before the revival of impeachment in the
1620s.”28 As I will show, commoners and courtiers alike were aware that monopolies
might be a contributing factor in the social upheavals experienced throughout the realm,
especially during the late 1590s.
The division between different modes of humanist discourse (Ciceronian and
Tacitean) has been described as a “divorce between an academic moral science, the
material of university courses, and the ethical and political attitudes of the people actually
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involved (even if at some remove) in the business of government.”29 But Peltonen notes
that the emergence of Tacitean humanism did not altogether replace the Ciceronian
mode. Rather, the two existed side by side. And, indeed, chapter three of Jack of
Newbury seems to be informed by both of them: Deloney looks on government activity
with a rather jaundiced eye in order to return it to a more just, balanced state, and he uses
the satiric mode in a way that is both diagnostic and instrumental. First, it allows him to
explore the ethics underpinning a new kind economic discourse. Satire is, by definition,
concerned with moral norms, a fact that has led some to the opinion that the genre
requires a certain homogeneity within its audience. Without an already established moral
norm on which to ground the satire, this argument goes, the satirist confuses or alienates
the reader. But I will argue that one of the distinctive things about satire by the end of the
sixteenth century is that writers such as Deloney are using it in its exploratory sense. At a
time of rapid economic change, during which skepticism is such a prominent feature of
the intellectual landscape, traditional moral codes lose their salience. New conditions call
for new actions, which in turn require a new ethic to underwrite them. Deloney’s satire
explores a new set of circumstances while avoiding recourse to an entire code, instead
advancing an ethic that is situational and analytical. In addition, Deloney’s use of parody
in Jack’s Allegory of the Ants allows him to appropriate the courtier’s role while
simultaneously distancing himself from it. Deloney creates a new form of the faithful
subject to counter the grasping courtier who profits from monopoly at the expense of the
commonwealth. Thus, while informed by a Tacitean realism, Jack’s allegory fulfills the
dual duty of the true Ciceronian courtier: diagnosing the problem by revealing the
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monarch’s irresponsibility, and then teaching the King the proper way to protect the
interest of his subjects.
Deloney was writing about economic issues prior to the entry of Jack of Newbury
in the Stationers’ Register on March 7, 1597.30 In June 1595, his twin vocations of
weaver and writer intersected when he penned a complaint signed by 14 London weavers
who blamed French and Dutch labor within England for their “great decaye and
ympoverishinge.”31 Forty copies of the letter were printed and distributed to the Elders of
both the French and Dutch churches in London, as well as to the Lord Mayor and
Aldermen of the city. The premise of the London weavers’ complaint was that French
and Dutch weavers pursued business practices not among those sanctioned by the guild.
Deloney protested that the foreign weavers
Exceede and kepe more Loomes and Servants then any Freeman dare
doe…they runne into the Countrye five or sixe myles from the Cittye out
of our Liberties, and there malitiously kepe and do what they list….[They]
live not like Strangers of another Countreye, nor like obedient subjects to
the Lawes and Customes of this land, nor like Christian bretheren, nor like
freindes nor like good neighbors.32
Perhaps Deloney and the English weavers believed that by going to both the foreign
ecclesiastical authorities in London and the local English secular authorities they were
bettering the chances that the situation would be resolved in their favor. However, the
Elders of the French and Dutch churches in London turned to the city authorities in
defense of their parishioners, and the presumptuous English weavers were promptly
imprisoned in Newgate until a petition to the Lord Chief Justice secured their release.33 In
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his treatment of the incident, Roger Ladd explains that, based on the evidence of letters
exchanged between the mayor and the lord treasurer, Deloney’s incarceration was not
simply the result of the letter’s content, but also due to the fact that the letter was
published.34 The Weavers’ Company itself had ordinances objecting to what it perceived
as unjust practices of foreign weavers. A 1585 decree refers to such alien practices as a
“great annoyance and hindrance of the said Company.”35 However, the crucial difference
is that the Company’s decree was strictly a matter of internal governance and was
circulated only among members of the livery company, whereas Deloney’s letter was
printed and distributed to members of the public.
Deloney’s second brush with the London authorities also involved putting his pen
to economic issues. In the 1596 he wrote and published what has come to be known as
“The Corn Ballad.”36 While the ballad is no longer extant, we can infer from official
reactions what the ballad might have contained that so rankled the establishment. In a
letter dated July 25, 1596, the Lord Mayor of London, Stephen Slany, wrote to Lord
Burghley of “a certain ballad contaynyng a Complaint of the great want and scarcity of
corn within the Realm.” Similar to the letter of June 1595, however, the Corn Ballad
seems to have raised the ire of city authorities not for the complaint itself but for the
“vaine and undiscreet manner” in which Deloney opted to air the grievances of the
London citizens. The Lord Mayor makes plain that the most offensive feature of the
ballad is its portrayal of the Queen in direct conversation with dissatisfied commoners.
He objects that the ballad
contayneth in it certain vaine and presumptuous matters bringing in her
highness to speak with her people in dialogue wise in very fond and
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indecent sort and [the ballad] prescribeth orders for the remedying of the
dearth of Corn…that thereby the poore may aggravate their grief, and take
some occasion of soom discontentment.37
The Lord Mayor objects to the commons engaging the Queen with such intolerable
familiarity and protests further their presumption in suggesting solutions for “remedying
of the dearth of Corn.” According to this paternalistic view, the commons may be
permitted to supplicate, but never to critique a situation, to diagnose a problem, or to
propose a solution. Furthermore, the Lord Mayor’s letter assumes that the commons is
incapable of offering anything in the way of constructive analysis: inclusion of the
“poore” in the discourse of government serves only to “aggravate their grief.” In contrast,
both the weavers’ letter and the Corn Ballad not only suggest that the constituents of the
commonwealth possess the ability rationally to probe issues such as artisanal competition
and dearth, but also that their observations should be given ear by those in power.
Deloney is active not only as a petitioner, but as an analyst of economic issues of his day.
Similarly, Jack Winchcombe shows himself to be more than a faithful and industrious
subject. His allegory of the ants, while essentially conservative in its view of rank and
obligation, advances a notion of the commonwealth as a variety of economic interests.
Like Thomas Smith, Jack sees these interests as working in concert, but not without
prudent policies to guide the natural drive of self-interest into the most productive
channels.
The first two chapters of Jack of Newbury are concerned largely with providing
the background of Jack’s rise to professional success and establishing his character as one
of industriousness, patriotism, sobriety, and business acumen. The third chapter of the
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episodic narrative opens with Jack assuming the role of stage manager, creating an
intentionally provocative allegorical scene in order to insinuate himself into the dialogue
of governance. A rhetorical astuteness (particularly in regard to kairos) is demonstrated
not only by Jack, who seizes the opportune moment to address his sovereign about
economic grievances, but by Deloney himself, who draws historical parallels between the
Henrician past depicted in his narrative and the Elizabethan present in which he is writing
in order to comment on how the commonwealth is being governed in the 1590s. The
narrator explains:
About the tenth year of the King’s reign, his Grace made his progress into
Berkshire, against which time Jack of Newbery clothed thirty tall fellows,
being his household servants, in blue coats, faced with sarsenet, every one
having a good sword and buckler on his shoulder… who knowing the
King would come over a certain meadow near adjoining to the town, got
himself thither with all his men and, repairing to a certain ant-hill which
was in the field, took up his seat there, causing his men to stand round
about the same with their swords drawn.38
On the most superficial level, the Statute of Liveries and the Sumptuary Laws would
seem to have rendered Jack’s outfitting of his servants transgressive in Henrician
England. While the livery laws of early Tudors were relaxed by the time of Elizabeth,
sumptuary laws were not. According to the Greenwich Statures of 1574, anyone below
the rank of knight was prohibited from wearing either sarcenet or a sword. Robert Zaller,
noting that such measures were an early form of “institutional control…on an economic
level,”39 compares sumptuary laws to the granting of monopolies in that each was a
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means of maintaining social order through crown prerogative. I submit that Jack’s
outfitting of his servants suggests not only a violation of royal edict, but an opposition to
the crown’s use of royal prerogative itself. As I will show, the issue of royal prerogative
lies at the heart of Deloney’s satire. As the episode unfolds, Deloney will focus his
criticism specifically on the granting of royal monopolies, itself a reification of the royal
prerogative, and on its deleterious effect on the commonwealth at large.
However, before treating the specific subversive elements of Jack’s display, I
want to consider the rhetorical situation in which the display is embedded. Infractions
such as Jack’s against sumptuary laws were in fact permissible in the context of
performances commonly played out along the route of a monarch on progress, during
which “the ritual actions and arrangement of costumed officials performing a tableaux of
civic self-definition”40 served the dual purpose of honoring the visiting monarch and
voicing local concerns. Thus far, Jack’s scene corresponds with these sanctioned
displays. William Leahy contends that “The number of allegorical devices presented to
the new Queen and audience were fundamentally part of a poetics of praise.”41 And Mary
Hill Cole concurs that while the progresses provided “an opportunity to speak across the
divides of status” they invariably did so “without challenging the divides of hierarchy.”42
However, when asked the meaning of the display, Jacks’ cryptic responses suggest a
criticism of the King. It is at this point that I would submit Jack’s scene departs from the
orthodoxy of civic display and enters the realm of satire. Jack will parody the language of
court and the royal progress itself to criticize what ultimately can be read as a censure of
Elizabethan economic policies of the 1590s.
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Once he has gained the attention of the King, Jack responds to questions posed by
the herald and later the King himself with answers that deliberately mimic the euphuistic
rhetoric of the Elizabethan courtiers, who were “the first to indulge in this excessive form
of language… peppering their speech with the proper amount of parison and isocolon,
assonance and rhyme.”43 The publication of John Lyly’s Euphues: The Anatomy of Wit in
1578 had prompted a rhetorical fashion at court that was both artificial and elaborate,
based on devices such as antithesis, isocolon, chiasmus, as well as a great deal of nature
imagery. According to Richard Helgerson, Lyly’s book advanced the idea that “Wit is the
skill at repartee required for success in the sophisticated, courtly conversazione.”44 Jack
adopts euphuism’s ornate trappings in order to assume an advisory role ordinarily limited
to courtiers. But, beyond that, Deloney parodies the affectedness of euphuistic rhetoric to
criticize an Elizabethan court culture that expresses “superior position not through any
productive pattern of economic behavior, but through such artificial aspects of manner as
elaborate dress and sophisticated talk.”45 Ultimately, his words to the monarch, even
though couched in the sanctioned rhetoric of the court, will criticize the King’s favoring
of courtiers—specifically through the granting of monopolies-- at the expense of the
commonwealth.
When first asked by the King’s messenger the meaning of the display, Jack
declares that he is “marquis of a molehill… chosen Prince of Ants.”46 While Jack’s
response may strike the reader as nonsensical, as it does the royal herald, the overblown
epithets and those that follow conform to the euphuistic speech of the late Elizabethan
court. Jack’s juxtaposition of the lofty and the humble, with its touch of alliteration,
moves the King to laugh “heartily.”47 Jack’s stylistic flourish not only mimics the florid
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speech of the late Elizabethan court, it also exploits the heuristic potential of antithesis,
which can lead to questioning the nature or basis of the disjuncture. More than merely
observing, the reader is invited (if not required) by Deloney’s use of the rhetorical trope
to resolve the disjunction of marquis/molehill and prince/ants. There are at least four
ways in which the reader can harmonize the dissonance and interpret the meaning of the
Jack’s cryptic self-identification. Perhaps the most conventionally satiric interpretation is
one aimed at Jack himself. But, as noted by William Leahy, in Renaissance allegory
“directed meanings are not the only possible ones…pageant creators beckon ambiguous
meanings,”48 and I want to argue that Jack uses this to full advantage in his satire. First,
“marquis of a molehill” can function to deflate the prestige of rank itself, thereby calling
into question the exclusivity of office. Second, the image may conversely insist on the
prerogative of the speaker himself, maintaining a defiant stance in defense of his own
jurisdiction, be it ever so laughably unsubstantial. Third, the image could suggest that the
disproportion is resolvable, or least mitigated, by granting the speaker more authority,
agency, or property. Lastly, the reader may interpret the image as an instance of irony in
which all of these possibilities are present. According to Linda Hutcheon, irony is
inclusive, involving oscillation “between the said and the unsaid…rapid perceptual or
hermeneutic movement between them….implies a kind of simultaneous perception of
more than one meaning.” 49 In this case, each of these meanings contributes not to a
single definitive conclusion, but to a polysemous field of inquiry concerning the nature of
authority and property. Jack’s response seems to raise more questions than it answers,
which is precisely how Deloney’s satire begins to work. Jack’s ironic use of euphuistic
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rhetoric allows him to begin destabilizing the very hierarchy in which it serves as a
marker of rank.
Curious to know further the meaning of Jack’s staged scene, the King summons
him to approach the royal train. The exchange between Jack and the King’s herald is a bit
of verbal sparring that incorporates what G.K. Hunter refers to as euphuism’s “unnatural
natural history.”50 Jack responds to the summons that “his Grace hath a horse and I am on
foot, therefore will him to come to me.”51 Jack is advancing a claim to dictating the
grounds, both literal and ideological, on which monarch and subject will meet. The
astonished herald objects “How dares the lamb be so bold with the lion?” And Jack
ripostes “if there be a lion in the field, here is never a cock to fear him.”52 The audacity of
Jack’s response is obvious, but it takes on greater significance when read in the context of
Jack’s staged tableaux. As Jack explains to the herald, were he to heed the summons, he
would be remiss in his duty to those dependent upon him: “tell his Majesty, he might
think me a very bad Governor, that would walk aside upon pleasure, and leave my people
in peril.”53 There is, I argue, an intended irony here, for this is exactly what the King
himself is doing. While the King is on parade, Jack must take charge of defending the
poorer members of the commonwealth. The satiric edge of Jack’s words becomes keener
when read in the context of Elizabeth’s progresses and how they were viewed during the
second half of her reign. Mary Hill Cole writes that, despite being “assiduous about
paying attention to business”54 while on progress, the queen’s frequent absences from
London were often viewed as “a time of confusion, sloth, and self-indulgence.”55
Petitioners, foreign ambassadors, councilors, and even those entrusted with the defense of
the realm frequently recorded their unease and dissatisfaction with what they perceived to
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be a lack of responsibility on the part of the peripatetic Queen. Hence Jack’s final words
to the King’s herald, “He that hath a charge must look to it, and so tell thy Lord my
King.”56 Jack has been criticizing further the monarch’s laxness in fulfilling his role
within the commonwealth. Furthermore, the delivery of the proverb alludes to the dual
function of satire as Deloney employs it. Thus far, Jack has used irony to destabilize
hierarchy and criticize the King. As his allegory continues to unfold, he will move on to
instructing the King by modelling the proper character of authority in the commonwealth.
Jack modulates his role from critic to teacher through a third instance of
euphuistic rhetoric, this time alluding to his role of protector during the King’s absence in
the past. While explaining to the herald his unwillingness to leave the anthill, Jack says
“while I am away our enemies might come and put my people in hazard as the Scots did
England while our King was in France.”57 Like the antithesis and “unnatural natural
history” of the previous examples, the chiastic structure of this statement encourages
comparison, contrast, discrimination, and evaluation. The two internal elements, “our
enemies” and “the Scots,” are analogous in that both are threats to the realm of England,
one in the past and one in the hypothetical future. The two external elements, Jack and
the King, are for a third time compared, again to Jack’s advantage. If Jack remains on the
anthill for the express purpose of defending his people, is there an implication that Henry
was somehow remiss in deciding to go to war with France? The inverted parallelism
suggests that Jack is doing what the King himself should have done. Moreover, Jack’s
words contain a tacit reminder that, during the King’s absence, Jack played a vital role in
the defense against the Scots:
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[Jack] came home in all haste and cut out a whole broadcloth for
horsemen’s coats, and so much more as would make up coats for the
number of a hundred men. In short time he had made ready fifty tall men
well mounted in white coats and red caps with yellow feathers, demilances in their hands, and fifty armed men on foot with pikes, and fifty
shot in white coats also, every man so expert in the handling of his
weapon as few better were found in the field.58
That is, Jack has been a selfless defender of the commonwealth in the past. Jack’s words
to the herald and his arming of his men to defend the anthill evoke memories of these
earlier preparations, which in turn point to the arming of his men to defend the anthill in
the episode now under consideration. A vital difference is that this time the threat is
internal. As Jack will explain to the King when the two finally come face to face, it is
“diverse ill members in the common-wealth”59 who are causing the people such hardship.
Jack’s use of euphuisms throughout this scene has garnered some small critical
attention, but the satiric import of his rhetorical strategy has not been considered. For
instance, Jack’s boast that “if there be a lion in the field, here is never a cock to fear him”
has been shown to be a direct borrowing from Thomas Fortescue’s The Forest: “The
mightie Lyon dreadeth and feareth the Cock.”60 Rollins’s suggests that Deloney’s
apparent debt to contemporary writers casts doubt on his knowledge of classical authors,
going so far as to allege that Deloney’s occupation as an artisan rendered it “improbable
that he was at all familiar with, say, many Latin and Italian works.”61 According to this
reading, Deloney’s borrowing is simply another example of the early modern practice of
adorning one’s own writing in borrowed plumage. But this overlooks several essential
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details. First, the claim is belied by Deloney’s translation in 1583 of several letters passed
between the archbishop of Cologne and Pope Gregory XIII, all of which were of course
originally penned in Latin. Given the pedagogical practices of sixteenth-century England,
it seems more improbable that anyone, artisan or no, could attain the linguistic facility
necessary for such an undertaking without gaining a familiarity with writers such as
Ovid, Plautus, Horace, Virgil, Cicero and Seneca. Second, Deloney’s use of euphuism is
strategic rather than merely imitative. By employing the euphuistic style, Jack is able to
address the sovereign in his own tongue, as it were. Even though the character of the
King does not speak in euphuistic style, it’s reasonable to assume that Deloney’s readers
in the 1590s would have recognized Jack’s linguistic embellishments as belonging to the
Elizabethan court. Indeed, by the time of Jack of Newbury’s entry into the Stationers’
Register, the euphuistic style was enjoying a popular vogue. Leah Guenther notes that
“As time passed… the popularity of Lyly's text stretched beyond its original courtly
circles: to the chagrin of courtiers, the embellished locutions of Euphuism could be found
on the tongues of the masses.” 62
But Jack is doing more than just mimicking the court style. This is not mere
parroting; it’s parody, an “appropriation of the voice of another twisted to new motive.”63
The ease with which Jack adopts and discards the extravagant idioms caricatures the
pretention of those “butterflies” whom he sees as harmful to the commonwealth. Most
importantly, his use of parody will allow him to at once appropriate and critique the
language of power. Linda Hutcheon notes that the “double etymology of the prefix
para”64 suggests how parody can be at once mocking and complicit. Para can denote both
“against” and “beside.” Jack adopts the accoutrements of civic display and euphuistic
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rhetoric in order to question the court itself. As Hutcheon points out, an essential
difference between parody and satire is in the nature of their targets. Parody’s target is
textual. That is, the target of parody is the parodied text itself. In contrast, satire’s target
is extra-textual: it lies beyond of the text. Deloney’s goal is not merely to criticize the
ritual of the royal progress or the affectations of the court. Rather, he parodies the
monarch’s perambulations and the artificial speech of courtiers as a way of gesturing
toward other more serious instances of negligence on the part of the crown. But, thus far,
Jack’s tableaux has only piqued the interest of the King. In the next phase of what is a
shrewdly designed piece of satiric stagecraft, Jack will draw the monarch into the scene
itself and interpret for him the meaning of the allegory of the ants.
As noted earlier, while scholars have noted that Jack’s scene accords with
conventional petitions to monarchs on progress, none have discerned the satire implicit in
his address to the King. Mary Hill Cole writes that “despite the different local
circumstances and requests, civic speeches to the queen had a common structure [and]
rhetoric,” one so clearly established that “everyone knew how the script should read.”65 If
this is so, then it is all the more likely that Deloney’s readers would have recognized his
inversion of this structure, especially as it follows on the heels of his parodying of the
euphuistic rhetoric of the court. The established structure of a petition to a monarch on
progress was a narrative of the town’s “illustrious history,” interlarded with episodes of
“royal aid on many occasions.”66 Instead, Jack delivers his allegory of the ants, a tale of
hardship that includes multiple insinuations of the King’s absence:
[N]ot long ago, in my conceit I saw the most provident nation of the ants
summoned their chief peers to a parliament which was held in the famous
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city Dry Dusty, the one and thirtieth day of September, whereas by their
wisdoms I was chosen their King; at what time also many bills of
complaint were brought in against diverse ill members in the
commonwealth, … the grasshopper and the caterpillar, because they were
not only idle, but also lived upon the labours of other men. Amongst the
rest the butterfly was very much misliked,… who through sufferance grew
so ambitious and malapert, that the poor ant could no sooner get an egg
into her nest but he would have it away[.]67
Rather than reinscribing an organic view of the commonwealth in which king and people
comprise a quasi-mystical unity, Jack offers a rudimentary anatomy of English society
comprised of conflicting interests. The source of the problem is not interest itself, but the
lack of an overseeing authority to police those interests. For Jack, this is the duty of the
highest secular authority: the King himself. The issue is not so much the legitimacy of
authority as it is the responsibility that is included in it. For this essential reason, Jack
explains to the King that the butterfly has grown proud “through sufferance,” presumably
of the King himself. In other words, the King’s failure to keep his courtiers in check is
the reason for the economic hardship experienced by the commons, which in turn is the
reason for the curious scene produced by Jack and, perhaps most importantly, the threat
of civil insurrection that it implies.
The language of Jack’s allegory as explained to the King evokes that recorded in
official transcripts and parliament diaries. The “many bills of complaint” brought against
the Grasshopper and the Caterpillar, which Jack has been called upon to pursue in his
allegorical parliament, focus on “ambitious” and “idle” members of the commonwealth
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who live “on the labors or other men.” Similarly, historical parliamentary clashes
regarding monopolies frequently deplored a situation in which the “principallest
commodityes ... are ingrossed into the handes of these bloodsuckers of the
commonwealth.”68 In 1601, Richard Martin’s protested that
Inward and Private Commodities dare not be used, without License of
those Monopolitans. If these Blood-suckers be still let alone, to suck up
the best and principallest Commodities… What shall become of us…and
the Commodities of our own Labour,69
Jack’s complaint that “the poor ant could no sooner get an egg into her nest, but [the
Butterfly] would have it away” resonates with a protest by William Hackwell to the
House of Commons in 1601:
Upon Reading of the Patents aforesaid, Mr. Hackwell of Lincolns-Inn
stood up, and asked this, Is not Bread there? Bread, quoth another? This
voice seems strange quoth a third: No quoth Mr. Hackwell, but if order be
not taken for these, Bread will be there, before the next Parliament.70
The agreement between Jack’s allegory and parliamentary opponents of monopoly seems
to be that the few are profiting at the expense of the many, a rapidly deteriorating state of
affairs that threatens the commonwealth itself.
That knowledge of these issues was not denied the commonalty is revealed by
Robert Cecil, who speaking about monopolies specifically complained that “Parleamente
matters are ordinarye talke in the streetes.”71 A journal entry from January 1595 records
that “the exactions and other inconveniences of Mr. Darcy’s patent cause great grief and
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murmur of the people throughout the land.”72 And indeed The Acts of the Privy Council
record how
of late certain apprentices of London violently took away a 1000 lbs.
weight of starch that had been seized on for her majesty’s use by Mr.
James Anton, her patentee, and not only carried the same to a warehouse
but did grievously beat and wound Mr. Anton’s deputies.73
These records indicate the topicality of monopolies and the violence attributed to them.
But beyond the currency of the debate and the anxiety concerning popular violence (real
or imagined), Deloney’s satire has in common with parliamentary opponents of
monopoly the belief that it is crown policy that leads to economic distress and then to
social upheaval.
In 1601, Sir George Moore attested to the civil unrest occasioned by monopoly on
salt and salterpeter and the anxiety that this caused civic officials. But, more importantly,
his metaphor of the body suggests that the Crown is responsible not only for the granting
of monopolies, but the resulting violence as well:
Many Grievances have been laid open, touching the Monopoly of Salt; but
if you had added thereunto Peter, then you had hit the Grief aright…There
be Three Persons; Her Majesty, the Patentee, and the Subject: Her Majesty
the Head, the Patentee the Hand, and the Subject the Foot. Now, here is
our Case; the Head gives Power to the Hand, the Hand Oppresseth the
Foot, the Foot Riseth against the Head.74
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Francis Moore, speaking in the same parliamentary session, gets to heart of the matter
when he argues that the granting of monopolies harms the commonwealth as a whole,
including the Queen herself:
There is no Act of Hers that hath been, or is more Derogatory to Her own
Majesty, or more Odious to the Subject, or more Dangerous to the
Common-Wealth, than the Granting of these Monopolies.75
But, in contrast to Deloney’s amenable monarch, Elizabeth was notoriously jealous of her
prerogative. Her view of the House of Commons, as expressed to the Lord Keeper that
they should “meddle with noe matters of state but such as should be propounded unto
them, and to occupy themselves in other matters concerning the commen wealth,”76
reveals a fundamental difference in how the commonwealth was perceived. Moreover,
that difference was largely economic. The debates over monopolies would extend to
larger questions by the turn of the century. By 1601, many MPs “demanded not just that
abuses [of monopolies] be addressed but that the legality of all such grants be challenged:
a clash over the prerogative was therefore unavoidable.” The isolated incident of
monopoly hence led to a fundamental question regarding the commonwealth. How far
should royal prerogative extend? And what was the proper balance between prerogative
and liberty? What most benefited the commonwealth? And what was the role of authority
within that polity? In sixteenth-century English satire we see a focus on particulars that
leads ultimately to a questioning of fundamental assumptions on which economic
theories are grounded. The relevance of Deloney’s use of satire is not limited to a single
economic grievance: it extends to how central political authority should function in the
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context of an increasingly complex economy. Policy, rather than prerogative, is seen as
the more fitting rudder for the ship of state.
When the King finally turns from his route and approaches the anthill, “Jack of
Newbery and his servants put up all their weapons, and with a joyful cry flung up their
caps in token of victory.”77 On the surface, this may appear to dispel the threat of
violence, to reduce the scene to mere symbolic play. But, again, when read against the
recent uprisings of the late 1590s, which continued to be a source of serious anxiety to
civic and royal officials, it would seem that the violence implicit in Jack’s scene threatens
to rupture the superficial deference implied by observation of conventional forms. The
fact that Jack’s retainers lay down their arms should not be misread simply as homage to
the King. The threat implicit in Jack’s display has already opened up interpretive avenues
that cannot now be closed off. His subsequent kneeling before the King effects what
Jonathon Dollimore, in a discussion of Jacobean anti-masque, describes as a “formal
restoration of providentialist/political orthodoxy, a compliance with its letter after having
destroyed its spirit.”78
But whereas it is the function of masque to re-order the impropriety of the antimasque, Jack’s kneeling down before the King is, again, cosmetic at best. Deloney’s
familiarity with and understanding of the economic situation during the later sixteenth
century must not be overlooked when interpreting Jack’s scene in book three of Jack of
Newbury. Read against the specific historical circumstances of the 1590s, Jack’s allegory
becomes an indictment of Elizabethan economic policy as the source of violent social
disorder. It also questions the role of royal prerogative in the life of the commonwealth.
The performative aspect of Jack’s scene has led Evelyn Tribble to suggest that Deloney
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uses the “complex semiotic system of civic pageantry”79 in part to avoid official
sanctions similar to those resulting from his Letter to the French Divines and his Corn
Ballad. Further, Tribble argues that Jack’s observance of rhetorical conventions when
arming and positioning his men “transmutes rebellion into pageantry,”80 mediating not
only the flouting of royal decree but also the defiance, not to say violence, implicit in the
spectacle of thirty armed men with swords drawn. In support of this, she cites several
precedents from the Henrician past, arguing that the threat of Jack’s armed men is
neutralized by memories of “May Day festivities of which Henry VIII was so fond…
[during] which disguised courtiers intercepted Henry and his entourage as they went out
to ‘fetch May.’”81 However, this romanticized reading is only possible if one overlooks
the immediate historical circumstances during which Jack of Newbury was published. I
would argue that, rather than contain the implicit threat of Jack’s display, the situation of
the progress in fact highlights the critique inherent in Jack’s words and actions. For
readers in the late 1590s, the image of Jack’s armed men doubtlessly resonated with more
recent memories. The simple mention of armed apprentices evokes the civil unrest that
plagued England throughout the 1590s. A royal proclamation issued on June 20, 1591
describes
sundry great disorders committed in and about her city of London by
unlawful great assemblies of multitudes of a popular sort of base
condition, whereof some are apprentices and servants to artificers.82
There were a dozen instances in June 1595 alone of London apprentices rioting
against exorbitant food prices and the jailing of their comrades,83 a crisis that prompted
the reissuing of the 1591 proclamation quoted above. The Trevelyan Papers record an
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anonymous letter copied from manuscript of 1598 that suggests the solidarity that could
exist among the apprentices and the means by which this group could effect retribution
for perceived wrongs. While the specific circumstances occasioning the unrest are
unknown, the preparation called for in the letter bears a striking similarity to Jack’s
staged scene. Reading the historical document alongside Deloney’s fictional episode
brings out the violent threat implicit in Jack’s apparently harmless and deferential stance:
After our most harty commendacions unto you goo brethren and
Prentyses….The

cause of our wryting unto you at this time is for to

know whether you will put up this iniurye or no: for to se our brethren
whypt and set on the pyllory without a cause, which is a greyef to us.
Desyring you to send an aunswere on waye or other, for yf you will not
put it up we do give consent to geather our selves togeather uppon
Bartholomew day in the feildes, some with daggers, some with
staves…betwixt 3 and 4 of the cloke in the afternoone against my Lo.
Mayor go to the wrestlinge, and there to be revenged of him[.]84
Both the letter and the official reactions to civil unrest make plain that participants and
observers both understood rank to be a marker of identity. Therefore, it seems more likely
that Deloney’s readers would have identified Jack’s “household servants” with the rioters
of the 1590s rather than the “disguised courtiers” two generations removed. I suggest that
Deloney intends his readers to draw parallels between Jack’s retainers and the apprentices
who caused such anxiety in 1590s London. Jack appropriates the trappings of the civic
pageant, producing a scene that ostensibly honors the monarch on progress, while at the
same time prompting memories of recent civic violence, which I argue he attributes to
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misgovernance on the part of the King. Thus, Jack’s use of the civic pageant is parodic:
He both participates in and critiques the ceremony of the civic pageant. Parody thus
serves to further his program as an interested member of the polity, allowing him access
to the monarch and the opportunity to critique the monarch’s economic agenda. Finally,
his parody of the civic pageant is satiric in that its ultimate target is much larger than the
rhetoric of the progress itself.
Jack’s political activism becomes more apparent when his own performance in
the staged scene is read alongside official proclamations responding to the riots of the
1590s. In the absence of a paid constabulary, a master or householder was expected to
police his apprentices and servants. In response to the rash of rioting London experienced
in June 1595, the Lord Mayor declared that “every householder [was] to have a sufficient
weapon at his dore for the preservation of her Maiesties peace.” In June 1597, responding
to violent disorder near the Tower, the Lord Mayor ordered that “householders be…ready
at the door…with a weapon in their hande.”85 This measure was to be taken not to keep
rioters out of the house, but to keep them in. Both the crown and the civic authorities
seem to have felt that the disturbances were the responsibility (if not the fault) of
householders who are “not able or not disposed to rule their servants as they ought to
do.”86 Jack parodies these proclamations and subverts the social theory that informs them
when he as householder arms his men each with “a good sword and buckler” while
apparently going unarmed himself.87
Jack’s words to his sovereign, while couched in the rhetorical blandishments of
the Elizabethan court, nevertheless suggest that the problem is systemic rather than local.
As such, it must be addressed at the executive level, the purview of the King himself.
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Rather than a moralistic attack on Cardinal Wolsey, an ill-famed scapegoat of a bygone
era, Deloney’s satire addresses the economic problems of the 1590s. Like Thomas Smith
in A Discourse on the Commonwealth of England, Deloney suggests that the social
harmony of a polity is a function of its economic well-being. Smith, writing in the middle
of the sixteenth century, attributes social ills to the debasement of currency under
Somerset. Although Deloney, writing in the 1590s, ascribes social disorder to a cause
different from Smith’s, both authors indorse the reformist notion that social stability is a
function of economic stability, which in turn is dependent on sound economic policy. In
his discussion of the 1599 Bishops’ Ban, Bryan Herek remarks on the efforts of
“Elizabethan authors … to develop a literary form that attended to the social, economic,
and political pressures acting upon the individual in particular historical moments.”88
Thus, in this sense, Deloney’s prose work may be classed with writers of formal verse
satire such as Hall, Marston, and Guilpin whose books were explicitly targeted by
Whitgift and Bancroft. However, Deloney’s avoidance of Juvenalian vitriol and his
participation in Native and Horatian satiric traditions distance him from these satirists.
Jack parodies both the euphuistic rhetoric of the court and the deferential rhetoric
of supplications to a monarch on progress to undercut the paternalism in which each of
them participates. But Jack’s display should not be read as simply attacking the
hierarchical structure of Henrician or Elizabethan England. His attitude toward power
falls somewhere between the naïve monarchism of the mid-sixteenth century and the
overt republicanism of the mid-17th century. Rather than simply attacking, Jack’s satire
aims at reforming the monarch’s failure to meet his obligations within this paternalistic
relationship, a failure which in turn threatens the stability of the hierarchical social
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structure. This motive to reform constitutes the fundamentally satiric quality of his
agenda. His goal is not to condemn the norms of reciprocity but to redefine and enforce
them, insisting that the King maintain a balance of power among the ranks of his
subjects. Quite apart from challenging the established order, Jack demonstrates to the
King that social stability is dependent on economic order, which in turn is dependent on
the policies of the King himself. The idea that the health of the commonwealth depended
on the King is not novel to the 1590s. Edmund Dudley, for instance, argued in the first
years of Henry VIII’s reign that the king was the soil out of which the tree of
commonwealth grew. But Dudley’s treatise was underwritten by a Christian ethic and
concluded that the king’s moral character would be absorbed by the commonwealth,
which would then flourish or fail depending on the integrity king’s example. A crucial
difference between Jack’s analysis and that of economic reformers of the early sixteenth
century is that Jack is concerned with economic policy rather than with the character of
the king.
Deloney’s pragmatism becomes even clearer when Jack’s satiric episode is
considered within the larger context of Jack of Newbury. Despite winning the King’s
support for his fellow clothiers, Jack nevertheless must contend with Wolsey later in the
narrative. Again, economic hardship is the problem. England’s wars on the Continent
disrupt trade, as English clothworkers are forbidden to traffic with French or Dutch
merchants, leading to a slashing of English wages and widespread unemployment.
Seeking redress, Jack organizes a large contingent of laborers who travel to London and
again appeal directly to the King, whose response to their petition reveals that the
Allegory of the Ants has left a lasting impression on him:
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‘My lords,’ quoth the King, ‘let these men’s complaint be thoroughly
looked unto, and their grief redressed, for I account them in the number of
the best common-wealth’s men. As the clergy for the soul, the soldier for
defence of his country, the lawyer to execute justice, the husbandman to
feed the belly, so is the skillful clothier no less necessary for the clothing
of the back, whom we may reckon among the chief yeomen of our land;
…Many more reasons there are, which may move us to redress their
griefs, but let it suffice that I command to have it done.’89
But the King’s easy slide into ‘body politic’ rhetoric is undercut by the disgruntled
Wolsey, still smarting from Jack’s “wars against the butterflies.” Entrusted with reestablishing economic ties between the English clothiers and their foreign markets,
Wolsey “put[s] off the matter from time to time,”90 leading Jack to quip “if my Lord
Cardinal’s father had been no hastier in killing of calves, than he is in dispatching of poor
men’s suits, I doubt he had never worn a mitre.”91 Wolsey’s father was a butcher in
Ipswich, and when the elitist Cardinal learns of Jack’s remark he causes all the clothiers
to be imprisoned in the Marshalsea. Friends of Wolsey intercept the clothiers’ petition to
the King, who is unaware of what’s happening, and it is only through the intercession of
the Duke of Somerset that Jack and his companions are released from prison and
reconciled with the Cardinal, who finally grants their suit.
This later episode suggests that Deloney is aware that satire has its limitations.
While its parodic elements have enabled Jack to exploit the porosity of the border
between king and subject, there is always the chance that satire will come up short when
faced with bureaucracy. Wit sometimes comes at a cost, as Jack’s four days in the
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Marshalsea have taught him. Granted, Jack’s satire opened the King’s eyes to royal
negligence in the first episode, and this in turn influenced his decision to grant the
clothiers’ economic petition in the second. However, the King is for a second time, if not
remiss, at least absent when it some to implementing whatever remedial measures he has
decreed. The Ciceronian humanist that informs Jack’s initial encounter with the King is
clouded over by a more Tacitean pragmatism as Jack becomes enmeshed in the
contending interests surrounding the monarch. Still, by eschewing Juvenalian anger and
adopting a dialogic Horatian approach, Jack not only speaks to power but engages with it,
even if the results are temporary or problematic. Deloney can thus be read as
participating in a trend of constructive satire expansive enough to accommodate and
explore the shifting and dimly perceived relationship between political power and a
national economy in the sixteenth century.
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Chapter Four
“A lewd moneyless device”: Marketing the Text in
Thomas Nashe’s The Unfortunate Traveller
Thomas Nashe’s The Unfortunate Traveller, published in 1594, is the story of
Jack Wilton, an enterprising English rogue whose escapades on the Continent are a
survey of early sixteenth-century European politics, dynastic struggles, and religious
wars. Ostensibly set during the reign of Henry VIII, Wilton’s tale is nevertheless firmly
rooted, thematically, in the 1590s. In this chapter I focus on Wilton’s time in the English
military camp and his subsequent travels to Germany, considering how Nashe uses the
detached picaro to record the varying economic dynamics underlying the political and
theological relationships among the people he encounters. Through the character of
Wilton, Nashe not only posits a market for his own literary product, but also shows how
early modern satire was expanding to accommodate contending positions, itself a
reflection of new conceptions of society as an amalgam of contending interests rather
than a monolithic, organic, hierarchal unity. The result is a work that both embodies the
emergence of a market based on dissimilar interests and marks an early attempt at
exploring this new phenomenon.
Nashe’s eccentricities as a writer have long defied scholarly taxonomy. Nashe’s
wit, while undeniable, creates a kaleidoscopic effect between the ludic and the sardonic,
and is oftentimes more dazzling than enlightening. Steven Mentz notes that pre-1970
critics most often viewed Nashe as an “artistic failure.”1 Stanley Wells tersely states of
The Unfortunate Traveller that “it has no organizing principle; it is not a unified work of
art.”2 G.R. Hibbard offers this more gracious apology for the work’s episodic structure:
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Nashe is essentially an improviser. He works in terms of what may be
described as scenes. Interested in the immediate, local effect he can
extract from an idea or situation, he works on it until he has exhausted its
possibilities or grown bored with it, and then moved on to something else,
unconcerned with its relationship with what has gone before, intent on
showing his craftmanship by treating it in an arresting manner and relying
on his virtuosity as a showman to cover up the gaps.3
Kiernan Ryan rightly argues that these earlier assessments are unfairly reductive and
informed by a “profoundly conservative ideology” interested in “pinning the author to
one unchanging vision and narrowing reality to an essential theme sealed within a single
form.”4 More recent critics have tried to understand Nashe’s idiosyncrasies on their own
terms, reading him either as a proto-postmodernist in the vein of Bakhtin or Kristeva, a
precursor of modern journalists, or an anti-humanist skeptical5 of an Elizabethan
epistemology. But the “Nashe problem” persists.
Narrowing our critical focus to the question of satire within The Unfortunate
Traveller, we are met with similar difficulties. It seems almost impossible to understand
its satire as enforcing moral boundaries between one group and another.6 Nashe’s satire is
so indiscriminate and omnidirectional that it threatens to devolve into a gleeful
misanthropy for its own sake. The “Nashe problem,” as described by Lorna Hutson is
rooted in this overabundance: “if we can even suspect that Nashe’s writings are not really
saying anything, they clearly lack the ethical commitment, the rhetorical efficiency, of
satire.”7 One way beyond this critical impasse is by expanding our understanding of the
“rhetorical efficacy” of satire beyond the wholly prescript-tive. Nashe’s fulsome
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descriptions with their apparent contradictions are less about separation than about
interrelatedness. If we focus instead on satire’s capacity for “shared inquiry”8 between
author and reader, Wilton’s apparently indiscriminate pillorying of virtually all he
encounters on his travels begins to emerge as exploratory, even constructive, of an
alternate space. Nashe’s idiosyncratic style and satire’s capacity to simultaneously
participate and critique allow for an interpretive through-line to Wilton’s otherwise
episodic narrative. The accumulation of satiric episodes suggests an emerging experience
of community economics, the complications of which were only partially understood and
which no lexicon yet existed to adequately describe.
To begin, I want to consider the two pieces of paratext that precede the narrative
proper: Nashe’s dedicatory letter to Henry Wriothesley, Earl of Southampton, and
Wilton’s Induction to the Dapper Monsieur Pages of the Court. The dedicatory letter and
the induction work in concert to establish the economic themes that I trace throughout
several episodes of The Unfortunate Traveller. Even though the two pieces of paratext
precede the narrative, they in fact bookend it in terms of the economic models they posit:
whereas the dedicatory letter to Wriothesley deals with the economy of patronage, the
induction to the pages of the Court suggests a market economy. The body of The
Unfortunate Traveller then uses Wilton’s satirical observations of economic and moral
relationships to move from the static dependency of the patronage model to the more
negotiable dynamic of the market.
In his dedication to Wriothesley, Nashe raises the problematic and interrelated
issues of arbitrary authority, a slavish conformity to tradition, and the idea of a literary
work as a useable commodity. Typical of the contrarian Nashe, his dedication to
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Wriothesley opens on a querulous note, doubting the relevance and utility of dedicatory
letters themselves: “I know not what blind custom methodical antiquity hath thrust upon
us, to dedicate such books as we publish to one great man or other.”9 He characterizes the
practice as one of outmoded conformity, “blind” and “methodical,” i.e., undiscerning and
dogmatic.10 (His choice of words may also be an attack on his enemy, Gabriel Harvey,
who had recently contrasted Nashe’s “licentiously heterogenized” style with that of the
“finest Methodists.”11) This opening line is not only a promise of things to come
stylistically speaking, it also uses the heavily freighted term “custom” to introduce a
theme running throughout The Unfortunate Traveller: the moral and material valuation of
a text as a saleable (or even allowable) commodity.
Despite the strictures of the patronage system, Nashe defers to “blind custom” out
of necessity. Deference to Wriothesley’s taste is the custom he needs to pay: “lest any
man should challenge these my papers as goods uncustomed and so extend upon them as
forfeit to contempt, to the seal of your excellent censure lo here I present them to be seen
and allowed.”12 According to the logic of the patronage system, the only security against
the scorn of the obtuse “any man” is the imprimatur of a discriminating patron. The text
cannot be transmitted by its own merit. Nashe resorts to a traditional trope13 to express
this dependence on Wriothesley, comparing the earl to a spreading tree “with whose juice
and sap [his writings] be evermore created and nourished.”14 Fundamentally hierarchical,
the trope posits a central authority figure as the sole source of inspiration, authorization,
and prosperity. For Nashe, professional success wholly depends on the sanction of his
noble patron, without whose “vigorous nutriment of…authorized commendation…never
will [his writing] grow to the world’s good liking.”15
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On the one hand, the dedication’s imagery accords with a fundamental social
conservatism found elsewhere in The Unfortunate Traveller, such as the Anabaptist
revolt discussed below. Even for an author as self-assured as Nashe, the value of one’s
work within the patronage economy is a function of a single elite patron: “How well or ill
I have done in it I am ignorant…. [O]nly your Honour’s applauding encouragement hath
power to make me arrogant.”16 On the other hand, despite its obligatory epideictic
rhetoric, the imagery of Nashe’s dedication to Wriothesley also registers doubts about
this dependence on a single, definitive index of his worth. For instance, he praises the
infallible good taste of his patron, writing to Wriothesley that “Unreprievably perisheth
that book whatsoever to waste-paper which on the diamond rock of your judgement
disasterly chanceth to be shipwrecked.”17 But the purity, refinement, clarity, and wealth
of “diamond…judgement” are complicated by the extended metaphor in which the image
is embedded. There is a certain arbitrariness to “chanceth,” especially troubling given the
absolute and irrevocable nature of the judgement. Moreover, recalling the dedication’s
opening metaphor of customs and trade, the question must be asked: when is a rock
anything other than a hazard to a ship at sea, something on which one’s ship and one’s
enterprise (whether mercantile or literary) might founder? The patron may be a “dear
lover and cherisher… of poets.”18 But the upshot is that Wriothesley is “dear” in two
contending senses: his patronage being esteemed but costly. Within the patronage
economy, dependence on the patron is indisputably requisite, potentially profitable, and
invariably risky. The patron is not simply a guarantor; deference to his tastes is the tax
the author needs to pay. Should Nashe fail to meet Wriothesley’s expectations, no matter
how unreasonable or misguided, his product will not be allowed to reach its public.
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In contrast to the elevated diction and fulsome praise of the dedication, which
centers attention solely on the figure of the noble patron, the parodic banter of the
induction is addressed to a corporate body of nameless “Dapper Monsieur Pages of the
Court.” This is a liminal moment, signaling both a break and a continuation. Signed by
Wilton (as opposed to Nashe), the induction marks the beginning of the narrative itself.
But it is also a continuation of the paratext, a parodic reflection of the dedication that has
preceded it. Without exactly criticizing or even reversing the patronage model, it
nevertheless dissolves its monopoly on assigning literary and economic value by showing
an alternative economy already in place and operative. The noble Wriothesley is not
effaced, merely sidelined as focus shifts to the pages “waiting together at the bottom of
the great chamber stairs.”19 Despite the patron’s presence in the background, it’s a scene
of radical decentralization, as the pages (and the reader’s attention) debouch onto the
street, moving from porch (the pages’ own “parliament house”) to tavern to stationer’s
stall. Peopled by servants, grocers, printers, and professional authors, the induction
dissolves established rank in a swelter of economic activity in which the proffered
narrative is comparable to other commodities. The materiality of the printed pages is
emphasized by the uses to which they may be put: “to dry and kindle tobacco,” “to stop
mustard pots,” “to wrap mace,” “To any use about meat & drink… for they cannot do
their country better service.”20 Thus, the narrative is construed as an artefact, a saleable
article, rather than a sign of service to a patron.
Moreover, the induction proposes a new criterion of worth. Whereas the
dedication focuses on Wriothesley as “the large spreading branch of renown” and on the
“diamond rock of [his] judgment” as the sole and incontrovertible index of value, the
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induction suggests gradations of use-value that may be assigned to the narrative by a
corporate body of commoners. These uses range from the scatological (“waste paper… a
privy token”) to the contractual (“a pawn in times of famine and necessity”) to the
ceremonial (“swear…on nothing but this chronicle of the king of pages henceforward”).21
Even if found wanting, the written narrative is integrated within this alternate economy,
rather than being “unreprievably” rejected by a single patron.
The economic plight of the professional English writer in the 1590s has been
recognized by literary historians for some time, and it’s a commonplace that “the
disappointed scholar [is] one of the major types of Elizabethan satirist.”22 Nashe’s own
contemporaries saw him as an example of the type, using him as a model for the
impoverished Ingenioso in the Parnassus plays depicting “the struggles of the scholar in
the late-Elizabethan world.”23 But even in this strained economic environment, “Nashe's
perennial cry of poverty”24 might be heard above the common cry. This is partly due to
how satire operates in the paratext. Read in tandem with the dedication, the induction
completes a satiric diptych in which the Dedication to Wriothesley discreetly insinuates
the incongruities of the client’s predicament, the Induction to the Pages that immediately
follows sounds a robust response, using parody and satire to construct an alternative to
the patronage economy. Comprising its own argot, practices, and standard of value, this
alternate space is a marketplace: a site of economic, social, and cultural exchange.
In an important sense, the actual narrative of The Unfortunate Traveller continues
the work begun in the paratext. From the very start of his tale, and within the brief span
of a mere several pages, the protagonist Jack Wilton parodies and co-opts some of the
most prominent literary forms of his day. Much has been made of Nashe’s conflicted
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relationship with the romance genre. John Berryman allows that The Unfortunate
Traveller is a “symbolic effort to wrench prose narrative out of euphuism and
romance.”25 Similarly, Georgia Brown writes that “Nashe’s own antipathy to romance as
a literary form remains virtually definitive of his career.”26 Lacking alternative long-prose
forms, Nashe uses satire to deconstruct those at hand, exploiting the porosity of their
discursive boundaries and opening a space for his own narrative, much in the same way
that he has already used parody in the induction to posit a market for his literary product.
The story opens in the early years of Henry VIII, using elevated language evoking the
medieval chanson de geste and the more recent historical chronicle:
About that time that the terror of the world and fever quartan of the
French, Henry the Eighth (the only true subject of chronicles) advanced
his standard against the two hundred and fifty towers of Tournay and
Terouanne, and had the Emperor and all the nobility of Flanders, Holland
& Brabant as mercenary attendants on his full-sailed fortune.27
But generic rules and readerly expectations are foiled by Wilton’s effortless shuttling
between high and low registers, oftentimes in a single sentence.28 A tragic violation
(“Turwin lost her maidenhead”) readily morphs into a crass joke (“and opened her gates
to more than Jane Tross did”); the promise of Wilton’s part in the young English king’s
venture (“where what my credit was”) devolves into blunt and amoral self-interest (“a
number of my creditors that I cozened can testify”). 29 This continues a process of
destabilization begun in the paratext. The difference is that now it is not only the
economic model but the product itself, the narrative, that is being dismantled with a view
to moving outside established criteria.
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In addition to historical writing, Wilton continues a burlesque of sixteenth-century
devotional literature begun in the induction, where he proclaims to his fellow pages that
“It shall be lawful for any whatsoever to play with false dice in a corner on the cover of
this foresaid Acts and Monuments.”30 As he begins to describe life in the English military
camp, he compares his own irreverent narrative to the martyrology of John Foxe, piercing
the boundary between the sacred and the profane: “What stratagemical acts and
monuments do you think an ingenious infant of my years might enact?”31 Going further,
he arrogates Holy Writ itself, inverting a biblical commonplace32 to impishly sanction his
mischief: “Those companies, like a great deal of corn, do yield some chaff. The corn are
cormorants, the chaff are good fellows which are quickly blown to nothing with bearing a
light heart in a light purse.”33 The biblical imagery of separation remains but is
transformed by a Machiavellian amorality. In his revision of the metaphor, Wilton shifts
the dichotomy between good and bad from a moral axis to one of expedience. That is,
some people are “quickly blown to nothing” through their own inability to make do. The
onus, if any, is placed squarely on their shoulders. The resulting moral ambiguity is
epitomized in the polysemous symbolism of the curiously inserted cormorant, which for
Nashe’s contemporaries could symbolize both greediness34 and duty to others.35
Just as he deflates the pretensions of historical and devotional literature, Wilton
shows that “lower” sub-genres of rogue literature are also insufficient to contain his tale.
His first episode is the duping of the camp tapster, a “peer of quartpots” whom he selects
to “damn with a lewd moneyless device.”36 Feigning friendship, Wilton deceives the
tapster into believing that he is being slandered as a traitor to the English army:
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It is buzzed in the King’s head that you are a secret friend to the enemy,
and under pretence of getting a licence to furnish the camp with cider and
suchlike provant, you have furnished the enemy, & in empty barrels sent
letters of discovery and corn innumerable.37
Utterly taken in, the credulous tapster tries to recoup his supposedly tarnished reputation
by giving away all he has to the rank-and-file:
But the next day I think we had a dole of cider, cider in bowls, in scuppets,
in helmets, and, to conclude, if a man would have filled his boots full,
there he might have had it; provant thrust itself into poor soldiers’ pockets,
whether they would or no.38
Despite an obvious affinity with the jest-book tradition, Wilton boasts that his own story
exceeds the capacity of that sub-genre: “I had done a thousand better jests if they had
been booked in order as they were begotten.”39 Similarly, he parodies the rejuvenated
prodigal of coney-catching literature, with its claims to moral edification and social
utility.40 Although he is ultimately found out and “pitifully whipped for my holiday lie,”
this merely serves as additional entertainment, as the king and his retainers “made
themselves merry with it many a winter’s evening after.”41 Wilton delights as much in the
perpetration as in the recounting of his exploits, even when he is hoist on his own petard.
His tongue-in-cheek offer that “as freely as my knavery was my own, it shall be yours to
use in the way of honesty”42 rehearses the dubious excuse of rogue literature since midcentury that it might either dissuade or at least forewarn its readership of sin in the world.
But given Wilton’s unabashed smugness43 in his own knavery (“This was one of my
famous achievements…. It is pity posterity should be deprived of such precious
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records”44), his parody of such admonitions serves as an advertisement for his own
literary product. There is no pretense to moralizing here. Wilton is not merely informing
us of the underworld of swindlers; he is inducing us to enter it with him. This is not
edification; it is an invitation.
Satire is an element common to all forms of rogue literature (e.g., the picaresque,
coney-catching pamphlets), so it is not surprising that Wilton’s three remaining episodes
in the English camp fit neatly in the realm of general satire. But, just as he punctures the
discursive boundaries of the genres discussed above, Nashe here foregrounds the
problems with satire. There is a great deal of ambiguity surrounding the satirist’s
motivation and, assuming he is acting in good faith, the efficacy of his attack. Ostensibly,
Wilton’s gulling of “an ugly mechanical captain,”45 a Swiss mercenary, and a “company
of coistrel clerks”46 is actuated by their embodying broad categories of human faults. In
the first instance, he exploits the undiscerning ambition of the captain, fabricating a
“silver-sounding tale” of “kingly promotion”47 to goad him into making a foolish foray
into the French camp. Apparently, the victim is targeted because of his inflated sense of
self-importance. But Wilton also discloses that the captain has been his collaborator in
other schemes, and “it not convenient [his] soldado should have [his] purse any longer for
his drum to play upon.”48 The second and third instances share a similar moral ambiguity,
the integrity of their satire being tainted by the self-interest of the satirist. Donning a
maid’s habit, Wilton exploits the lust of a Swiss mercenary “that was far gone for want of
the wench,” absconding with “the earnest-penny of impiety, some six crowns at the least
for an antepast to iniquity.”49 Finally, he raises a false alarm and scatters a company of
clerks, “goose-quill braggadocios” who, he tells us, “were mere cowards and cravens.”50

114
Surely, this would appear to be just treatment according to the moral code of a military
force on the march. Indeed, Wilton claims the satirist’s mandate to ridicule the moral
flaws of his targets:
I think confidently I was ordained God’s scourge from above for their
dainty finicality. The hour of their punishment could no longer be
prorogued, but vengeance must have at them at all adventures….
[W]herefore on the experience of their pusillanimity I thought to raise the
foundation of my roguery.51
This is Wilton’s final comment on his adventures in the English camp, and it explicitly
points out the satiric thread running through each of his capers and through much of
rogue literature in general. By virtue of their outsider status, tricksters and picaros can
pull back the veil from otherwise sacrosanct institutions and reveal underlying hypocrisy.
But by now a narrative and thematic pattern has been established in The Unfortunate
Traveller, and the reader is not surprised to learn that Wilton plunders the company
payroll after the clerks have taken to their heels.
The first third of The Unfortunate Traveller undoubtedly fits under the heading of
general satire, but the congruence isn’t absolute. By foregrounding Wilton’s self-serving
and self-aggrandizing agenda, Nashe is doing more than simply attacking the foibles of
Wilton’s targets, and he goes far beyond the contaminated yet authoritative voice of, for
instance, Philomene in The Steele Glas. If anything, Wilton’s mixed messages actually
invite the perennial accusations that the satirist is merely contrarian, misanthropic, selfserving.52 Nashe seems to be satirizing satire itself, just as he has parodied historical,
devotional, and rogue literature. Perhaps this is most obvious when Wilton returns to
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England. Despite being “close at hard-meat,”53 i.e., “under strict restraint,”54
(undoubtedly due to his antics while in camp), he adopts exactly the pretensions he has
just targeted while in camp, while continuing to parody the moral claims of the satirist:
“For your instruction and godly consolation, be informed that at that time I was no
common squire, no undertrodden torch-bearer; I had my feather in my cap as big as a flag
in the foretop.”55 Moreover, the catalogue of his affectations recalls the grotesqueries of
his recent victims. The tapster’s “great velvet breeches” and “ill-favoured goat’s beard,”
56

the Switzer’s “scabbed elbows,”57 the clerks’ “near bitten beards” and “crab-lice”58 are

all of a piece with
my French doublet, gelt in the belly as though (like a pig ready to be
spitted) all my guts had been plucked out; a pair of side paned hose that
hung down like two scales filled with Holland cheeses; my long stock that
sat close to my dock, and smothered not a scab or a lecherous hairy sinew
on the calf of the leg;…and a black budge edging of a beard on the upper
lip, & the like sable auglet of excrements in the rising of the angle of my
chin.59
This is more than simply a coda to his recent exploits: it is their consummation. Wilton’s
indiscriminate satirizing of everyone finally leads to effacement of any distinction
between satirist and satirized. His cheerful concession of any moral high ground
frustrates attempts to construe Nashe’s satire as socially constructive, and his ludic
nihilism leads Lorna Hutson to suspect Nashe of being “simply incapable of carrying out
the old-fashioned prescription with conviction.”60 There seems to be no ironic distance
here between Nashe and Wilton, as Wilton is plainly in on the joke even though it is at
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his expense. At this point, the satire within The Unfortunate Traveller seems to accord
with Northrop Frye’s early conception of the mode, a conception predating his more
maturely developed theory in Anatomy of Criticism: “Satire at its most concentrated…
[is] a universal negation that cheapens and belittles everything.”61
But the reader must remember that there is more to the story. Thus far we have
been following “an ingenious infant”62 playing the “poor, childish wellwiller”63 to his
dupes. Despite his rhetorical sophistication, his satire has been impulsive and narcissistic.
Now, Wilton tells us, he intends to “quietly descend to the waning of [his] youthful
days.”64 There is a formal correlative to this, as Wilton is aware that he “must not place a
volume in the precincts of a pamphlet.”65 Hibbard suggests that Nashe at this point
realized he “had done something new with the pamphlet” and decided to explore “the
new vein further.”66 Leaving aside Hibbard’s speculative theory of Nashe’s composition
process, the fact remains that there is a modularity to the finished product. Wilton’s
returns to the Continent marks a change not in disposition (he remains unscrupulous in
his dealings and irreverent in his tone) but in what satire allows him to see. In contrast to
the first part of The Unfortunate Traveller, in which vice is easily attacked and exploited,
the second third of Nashe’s narrative shows a satire of subtly increasing complexity. As
he travels through the “religiously and politically charged”67 environs of Muenster,
Rotterdam, and Wittenberg, a more seasoned Wilton shifts his focus from individual to
collective targets and begins to discern the economic basis underlying much of the strife
he observes.
Fleeing the sweating sickness epidemic of 1517, Wilton returns the Continent,
there to seek employment as a mercenary in the French king’s 1515 expedition to recover
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Milan: “As at Turwin I was a demi-soldier in jest, so now I became a martialist in
earnest.” True to form, this is a set-up for subsequent deflation, and he immediately
reveals that he means “to thrust [himself] into that faction that was strongest.”68 With no
pretensions to ideological investment and apparently still motivated by an amoral selfinterest, Wilton seems poised to rehearse the same sort of mischief as he did while in the
English camp. But there is a difference. Here there are no pranks, as Wilton assumes the
role of passive observer. Still sardonic in his commentary and reliant on the grotesque,
his descriptions of events around him take on a decidedly darker and more visceral tone
than before:
I saw a wonderful spectacle of bloodshed on both sides; here unwieldy
Switzers wallowing in their gore like an ox in his dung, there the sprightly
French sprawling and turning on the stained grass like a roach new taken
out of the stream; … the plain appeared like a quagmire, overspread as it
was with trampled dead bodies. In one place might you behold a heap of
dead murdered men overwhelmed with a falling steed instead of a
tombstone, in another place a bundle of bodies fettered together in their
own bowels, and as the tyrant Roman emperors used to tie condemned
living caitiffs face to face to dead corses, so were the half living here
mixed with squeezed carcasses long putrified….The French King himself
in this conflict was much distressed, the brains of his own men sprinkled
in his face[.]69
This apocalyptic vision concludes anticlimactically, with “Milan surrendered unto
[Francis I] as a pledge of reconciliation” and Wilton, “like a crow that still follows aloof
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where there is carrion,”70 proceeding to the Anabaptist revolt at Muenster. Always on the
wing, the peripatetic rogue now observes from a distance, unhampered by any moral code
or direct participation (or by historical plausibility, the two events being separated by 19
years).
At Muenster, Wilton’s satirizing of the rebels focuses on their social status and
exemplifies Nashe’s “baffling mixture of political conservatism and aesthetic
radicalism.”71 The rebel leader, John Leyden, is described as wearing
a scarf made of lists like a bow-case, a cross on his breast like a thread
bottom, a round twilted tailor’s cushion buckled like a tankard-bearer’s
device on his shoulders for a target, the pike whereof was a pack-needle, a
tough prentice’s club for his spear, a great brewer’s cowl(?) on his back
for a corslet, and on his head, for a helmet, a huge high shoe with the
bottom turned upwards, embossed as full of hobnails as ever it might
stick.72
Leyden is thus a composite figure of his followers, who “were all base handicrafts, as
cobblers and curriers and tinkers.”73 It’s noteworthy that, for Wilton, the rebels are not
simply associated with their trades, they are wholly defined and identified by them: they
do not simply practice base handicrafts; they are base handicrafts.
To Wilton, the greatest fault of the Anabaptist rebels is that “they were so
dunstically set forth, and … thought they knew as much of God’s mind as richer men.”74
Despite his own unprincipled behavior thus far, he is nevertheless invested in an
established hierarchy, and he is merciless in his treatment of any who question it. So
embedded is the belief in hierarchy that even the rebels themselves appear unable to step
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outside of it. Even in their protest they take for granted the fundamental authority of its
ideology:
so grounded and gravelled were they in this opinion, that now when they
should come to battle, there’s never a one of them would bring a blade (no,
not an onion blade) about him, to die for it. It was not lawful, said they, for
any man to draw the sword but the magistrate[.]75
The gruesome scene of the battle recalls that of the French expedition to recover Milan
(“so ordinary at every footstep was the imbruement of iron in blood that one could hardly
discern heads from bullets, or clottered hair from mangled flesh hung with gore”76) but
Wilton plainly takes sides in this contest. He cannot help but “dilate a little more gravely
than the nature of this history requires,”77 and delivers a strident polemic against the
Anabaptist rebels that seems jarringly at odds with his moral detachment up to this point
in the narrative. Hibbard notes that Wilton’s account of the quashing of the rebellion is
“undiluted pamphleteering”78, and there is an obvious stylistic and ideological debt to
Nashe’s own anti-Martinist tracts of the previous decade, in which Nashe defended the
Anglican establishment against its Puritans detractors. In fact, Wilton conflates the two
groups (“Hear what it is to be Anabaptists, to be Puritans, to be villains”79), even though
there are significant historical and confessional distinctions between them. For Wilton
(and Nashe?), the point here is the common threat they pose to the established social
order.
More to my point, Wilton’s satirizing of the rebels is just as much economic as it
is political or religious. Wilton delegitimizes Leyden and the rebels by attributing their
religious heterodoxy to a kind of class envy:
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[T]hey would reduce us to the precedent of their rebellious persecuted
beggary, much like the sect of philosophers called cynics, who, when they
saw they were born to no lands or possessions, nor had any possible means
to support their estates, but they must live despised and in misery, do what
they could, they plotted and consulted with themselves how to make their
poverty better esteemed of than rich dominion and sovereignty. 80
There is no jesting or irony in Wilton’s diminution of the Anabaptists, only a straight
denouncing of their motives. No longer the youthful prankster of the English camp, this
older Wilton for the moment exchanges satire for invective. He has not, however, lost his
knack for adapting materials at hand to suit his own purposes. In this case, it is the story
of Diogenes, “one of the first and foremost of the ringleaders of this rusty morosity.”81
Extrapolating from a piece of apocryphal history, Wilton implies that the motives of the
rebels are not merely spiteful but dishonest: “Diogenes… for all his nice dogged
disposition and blunt deriding of worldly dross and the gross felicity of fools, was taken
notwithstanding a little after very fairly a-coining money in his cell.”82 This hypocritical
inconsistency is then extended to include the Radical Protestant congregation of the
Continent: “our cynical reformed foreign churches… will digest no grapes of great
bishoprics, forsooth, because they cannot tell how to come by them[.]”83 Like Aesop’s
fox, the Anabaptists criticize what they do not possess because they cannot possess it.
The Anabaptist revolt is the first of three episodes in this segment of The
Unfortunate Traveller, each of which will contribute a different view of economic
conflict. Here Wilton appears to be wholly in step with traditional hierarchy. The
Anabaptist radicals are infantilized as followers of a “dead-born faith…begotten by too
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too infant fathers,”84 whereas the paternalistic elite is described by Wilton as harsh but
ultimately benign: “The imperials themselves … were [the rebels’] executioners, like a
father that weeps when he beats his child, yet still weeps and still beats.”85 At this point,
Wilton’s understanding of political power accords with the economic power structure of
the patronage model. He suggests that hierarchy, despite (or because of) its prerogative
and unyielding nature, is perhaps the only safeguard against the perils of an otherwise
chaotic world. This, of course, ignores the fact that he is surrounded by chaos. Moreover,
it overlooks the possibility foundering on the hierarchy’s judgement, as insinuated in the
dedicatory letter to Wriothesley.
Wilton recognizes that his strident excursus has led him astray: “I am as it were
more than duncified twixt divinity and poetry.”86 Nashe rescues his floundering
protagonist from discursive and geographic uncertainty by introducing Wilton’s “late
master,”87 Henry Howard, the Earl of Surrey. It is no coincidence that Wilton, who shares
Nashe’s concern with literary forms and their function in society, should be in the
nominal service of a poet credited by Elizabethan readers with the inauguration of a
nationalist poetics. Nor is it coincidence that the two immediately proceed to Rotterdam
and there encounter “quick-witted” Thomas More and “that abundant and superingenious clerk”88 Desiderius Erasmus, for together the humanist luminaries introduce
ideas of rank, wealth, and social cohesion that problematize the conservative view Wilton
took of the rebellion at Muenster:
Erasmus in all his speeches seemed so much to mislike the indiscretion of
princes in preferring of parasites and fools that he decreed with himself to
swim with the stream, and write a book forthwith in commendation of
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folly. Quick-witted Sir Thomas More travelled in a clean contrary
province, for he seeing most commonwealths corrupted by ill custom, &
that principalities were nothing but great piracies, which, gotten by
violence and murder were maintained by private undermining and
bloodshed, that in the chiefest flourishing kingdoms there was no equal or
well-divided weal one with another, but a manifest conspiracy of rich men
against poor men, procuring their own unlawful commodities under the
name and interest of the commonwealth, he concluded with himself to lay
down a perfect plot of a commonwealth or government, which he would
entitle his Utopia.89
The idea of “rich men against poor men” reiterates the economic basis of conflict that
Wilton began to recognize at Muenster. However, Wilton’s unexamined conservatism
and authoritarianism are now complicated by the idea that such conflict stems not from
simple class envy but from the “indiscretion of princes,” that a commonwealth is little
more than “a manifest conspiracy,” that there simply is “no equal or well-divided weal.”
Thus, violent eruptions are not aberrations from a stable organic social model but are
rather the norm: economic antagonism is a constitutive piece of every polity. The
mercantile idiom of Nashe’s Dedication to Wriothesley is glancingly reiterated by
“unlawful commodities,” “ill custom,” and “great piracies.” The gruesome suppression of
the Anabaptists is recalled and reinterpreted by More’s argument that governments are
“maintained by… bloodshed.” The brief detour into Rotterdam, which appears
geographically arbitrary (Wilton explains that the city was “clean out of [their] way”90
without providing explanation for why they go there), is thus a thematic turning point. By
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way of Wilton’s observations, Nashe signals the suspicion that conflict is endemic and
inevitable, and that attempts to suppress it are stopgap at best and are at worst violent and
unjust.
This patent intertextuality has an additional, more subtle consequence for The
Unfortunate Traveller. Not only do the references to Utopia and In Praise of Folly
deepen the satiric probing of economic and political power, and provide Nashe’s satire
with an obvious genealogy, but his handling of these additional texts also continues the
idea begun in the induction of the text as a commodity no longer in need of either patron
or author. Despite his penchant for satiric blazons of the people he meets, Wilton avoids
providing any portrait of either More or Erasmus, casually eliding their persons and
mannerisms by telling us that “it were here superfluous to rehearse”91 his conversation
with the two luminaries. Instead, he focuses almost exclusively on their “discontented
studies,” and his precis of their satires makes up the entirety of the brief encounter in
Rotterdam. The modifiers that Wilton does provide for the two great humanists seem
pointedly incongruous with his descriptions of their satires. It is “grave” Erasmus who
writes in “commendation of folly” and “merry” More who speaks of corruption and
violence.92 In either case, the nature of the satire is independent of the satirist’s
temperament, suggesting a decoupling of author from text. Just as Wilton has been
steadily moving away from the center of his own story, both More and Erasmus fade in
significance when compared to the significance of their works themselves. This
relegation of More and Erasmus to the background echoes the sidelining of Wriothesley
in the induction, where the interpersonal relationship of patronage is superseded by a
market economy in which the text moves as an independent commodity. The Rotterdam
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episode furthers this idea, suggesting how even seminal texts such as Utopia and In
Praise of Folly possess their value inherently, rather than deriving it from either patron or
author.
At Wittenberg, Wilton witnesses a concord of religious and political authority that
is the inverse of the violent contention he saw at Muenster. The people have gathered to
pay tribute to the Duke of Saxony, “because he was the chief patron of their university,
and had took Luther’s part in banishing the Mass and all like papal jurisdiction out of
their town.”93 However, his recent exposure to the ideas of More and Erasmus has
sensitized him to the ubiquity of economic tensions, and he immediately begins to discern
the fault lines within this apparently felicitous union. First, his blanket satirizing leads
him to divide the people of Wittenberg into two groups: “the heads of their university…
in their hooded hypocrisy and doctorly acccoutrements" and the “burghers and dunstical
incorporationers,”94 both of whom he ridicules for their overwrought orations delivered to
the Duke:
They imagined the Duke took the greatest pleasure and contentment under
heaven to hear them speak Latin, and as long as they talked nothing but
Tully, he was bound to attend them. A most vain thing it is in many
universities at this day, that they count him excellent eloquent who
stealeth not whole phrases but whole pages out of Tully. If of a number of
shreds of his sentences he can shape an oration, from all the world he
carries it away, although in truth it be no more than a fool’s coat of many
colours. No invention or matter have they of their own, but tack up a style
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of his stale gallimaufries. The leaden-headed Germans first began this, and
we Englishmen have surfeited of their absurd imitation.95
Then, moving beyond simple ridicule of an outmoded Ciceronianism,96 Nashe’s satire
pries into the economic divisions by which this apparently unified community is riven.
Unlike Muenster, where the readily dismissed envy of base laborers threatens social
cohesion, here it is the more privileged ranks of academics and merchants that impedes
integration. While jockeying for position before the Duke, both groups are shown to be
incapable of fulfilling their proper roles within the community, an inability which in
either case is framed as a kind of impoverishment. The representatives of Wittenberg
University address the Duke in “gibberish” and “some three-halfpenny worth of Latin….
[B]ut it was choice stuff, I can tell you, as there is a choice even amongst rags gathered
up from the dunghill.”97 As mentioned above, the figure of the needy scholar was
especially prevalent by the 1590s and was frequently invoked by Nashe. Here, however,
the academics are not materially but intellectually destitute. In their rush to curry favor
from political authority their collective identity is drained of political legitimacy and
economic utility as the junior graduates of Wittenberg University are reduced to a
“miserable rabblement” and a “company of beggars.”98
The guild members fare no better, as the official uniform of their corporate body
and the very symbol of its economic function is transformed by Wilton’s satiric punning
into a grotesque physical manifestation of incontinence. For instance, he describes the
merchant’s
distinguished liveries, their distinguished livery faces, I mean, for they
were most of them hot-livered drunkards, and had all the coat colours of

126
sanguine, purple, crimson, copper, carnation that were to be had in their
countenances. Filthy knaves, no cost had they bestowed on the town for
his welcome, saving new painted their houghs and boozing houses, which
commonly are fairer than their churches, and over their gates set the town
arms carousing a whole health to the Duke’s arms[.]99
In addition to Wilton’s satirizing of both academics and merchants, there is sniping
between the two groups. The “bursten-belly ink-horn orator”100 Vanderhulke is the most
apparent mouthpiece of this competition. A grotesque figure often interpreted as a
personal jab at Nashe’s bete noir Gabriel Harvey,101 Vanderhulke brings to the fore the
issue of economic division among the townspeople, insisting on the greater usefulness of
merchants to the Duke:
On our shoulders we wear no lambskin or miniver like these academics,
yet we can drink to the confusion of thy enemies. Good lamb’s-wool have
we for their lambskins and for their miniver, large minerals in our
coffers.102
The division between lambskin, symbolizing both academic regalia and the parchment on
which a diploma is written, and lamb’s-wool, i.e. a staple commodity in Europe’s
increasingly integrated economy, reveals that the town’s celebration of religious
solidarity with the Duke is also a contest among the people for his recognition, with a
significant criterion being their economic utility to political authority. Although
Wittenberg lacks the violence of the Anabaptist revolt at Muenster, it is similarly chaotic
and imbued with a similar economic factionalism.
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The difference is that in Wittenberg there is no overarching centralized power
able to impose order. The rivalry among the townspeople takes center stage and becomes
more anarchic as the figure of the Duke recedes into the background and is reduced to
being inert and ridiculous. He listens and observes but does not himself speak, and as the
orators are “emptying their phrase books the air emptie[s] his entrails,” he is forced to
“stand in the rain till he [is] thorough wet.”103 Even while being compared to the “nine
worthies” and assured of “Nestor’s years,”104 the Duke is figuratively urinated on. This
piece of Rabelaisian absurdity inverts the paternalism of the Muenster episode, depicting
the representative of political authority as passive consumer and figurehead.
A similar deflation occurs regarding the disputations of Reformation luminaries
Martin Luther and Andreas Karlstadt, with similar results.105 Despite the centrality of
both their persons and their theological positions within Reformation historiography, to
say nothing of Luther’s obvious historical connection to Wittenberg, both are here
reduced to noise and empty gestures:
A mass of words I wot well they heaped up against the Mass and the Pope,
but farther particulars of their disputations I remember not. I thought
verily they would have worried one another with words, they were so
earnest and vehement. Luther had the louder voice; Carolostadius went
beyond him in beating and bouncing with his fists.106
Just as the Duke’s silence intensifies the voices of the people of Wittenberg, the noise and
gesticulating of the two theologians are immediately drowned out by the voices “all the
other train of opponents & respondents” to which Wilton turns:
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One pecked with his forefinger at every half-syllable he brought forth, and
nodded with his nose like an old singing man teaching a young chorister to
keep time. Another would be sure to wipe his mouth with his handkerchief
at the end of every full point, and ever when he thought he had cast a
figure so curiously as he dived over head and ears into his auditors’
admiration, he would take occasion to stroke up his hair, and twine up his
mustachios twice or thrice over, while they might have leisure to applaud
him. A third wavered & waggled his head like a proud horse playing with
his bridle, or as I have seen some fantastical swimmer at every stroke train
his chin sidelong over his left shoulder. A fourth sweat and foamed at the
mouth for very anger his adversary had denied that part of the syllogism
which he was not prepared to answer. A fifth spread his arms like an usher
that goes before to make room, and thripped with his finger and his thumb
when he thought he had tickled it with a conclusion. A sixth hung down
his countenance like a sheep, and stutted and slavered very pitifully when
his invention was stepped aside out of the way. A seventh gasped for
wind, & groaned in his pronunciation as if he were hard bound with some
bad argument.107
Wilton claims that Luther and Karlstadt “uttered nothing to make a man laugh”108 and
that this is the reason he turns to describing the cacophony of the unidentified debaters.
But there is deeper significance to this shift in focus, one beyond an immediate concern
for entertainment. Even though Wilton ridicules the speakers, the fact remains that it is
their voices that are being heard. The marginalizing of Luther and Karlstadt continues a
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trend of decentralization prefigured in the induction and more fully developed as Wilton
travels through Muenster, Rotterdam, and Wittenberg. Despite Hibbard’s belief that in
moving from one episode to the next Nashe is “unconcerned with its relationship with
what has gone before,”109 in Wittenberg we see that Nashe is building on Wilton’s
experiences to bring his rogue to a greater understanding of authority. It is the accretion
of these apparently isolated episodes that allows Wilton to conceive the alternative to
patronage presented in the paratext. He is not yet the celebrator of untrammeled exchange
who pens the induction. But he has moved beyond both the narrow focus of immediate
gratification he displayed in the English camp, as well as beyond the questionable
confidence in hierarchy he displayed at Muenster. These two changes in his outlook
allow him to consider the scene at Wittenberg as chaotic but harmless and freed from the
overarching authority of hierarchy.
According to Allyna Ward, Germany provides a setting for Wilton “to criticize
not just the Anabaptists and the German character but also to comment on English
Puritan reform.”110 In other words, the satire of the Wittenberg episode is of a piece with
the Muenster episode, each of them reflecting “the waywardness of the religious and
political leaders and the lack of logic behind their disputations, which might also apply to
extremist groups in England.”111 This is surely a defensible interpretation, especially
given Nashe’s open hostility to Puritanism throughout his writing career. But Ward’s
reading overlooks key historical distinctions between Muenster and Wittenberg and the
importance of the Rotterdam episode interpolated between the two. In The Unfortunate
Traveller, Nashe takes pains to draw a clear distinction between Muenster and
Wittenberg, using Muenster to represent the Radical and Wittenberg to represent the
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Magisterial Reformations. At Wittenberg Nashe shows us an apparently ideal integration
of the two institutions, as the people of Wittenberg “crouched to [the Duke] extremely.”
And yet, sensitized by his exposure to the ideas of More and Erasmus, Wilton sees that
there is competition within the polity even in the absence of open rebellion. He therefore
drops the partisan position he adopted at Muenster, declines to take sides, and instead
methodically works through various positions of power/authority, exploring the political
and economic situation at hand in all its ludicrous convolutions. Wittenberg may be read
as the culmination of a development that ultimately leads to Wilton’s recognition of
competing interests as a constituent piece of the polity, a force that counters the ordering
imposed by hierarchy, and in which language moves fluidly, anarchically, and
subversively. Returning to the bipartite structure in the paratext, one might see how these
experiences have allowed Nashe-Wilton to move from the economic model presupposed
by the dedication to that of the induction: the movement from individual to corporate
authority, from a close-ended system to an open-ended, from the fixed to the contingent.
Ultimately, Wilton’s gradual awareness of underlying economic tensions, regardless of
prevailing ideology, allows him to discern and address the inescapable economic
pressures introduced in the Dedication to Wriothesley and the Induction to the Pages.
Throughout The Unfortunate Traveller, Nashe’s satire sinuously weaves generic,
moral, and hierarchal distinctions. The young Wilton’s literary pastiches at the opening
of his narrative break down barriers between “high” and “low” genres, i.e. historical and
devotional versus popular forms; an older Wilton’s satire works to debunk purported
ideological differences, at times revealing the economic divisions underlying them. The
supposedly anti-materialist Anabaptists desire the same power and wealth they are
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attacking; Wittenberg’s scholars and merchants both reveal their intellectual
impoverishment in their pandering to the Duke; even the towering historical figures of
Luther and Karlstadt are conflated, their doctrinal differences lost in the spectacle of their
shared public performance. Similarly, Wilton’s own position is repeatedly subjected to
revision. Against the Switzers he looks only for personal gain. Against the Anabaptists he
espouses strident conservatism. At Rotterdam he assumes the role of student, duly
registering the lessons of More and Erasmus about the pernicious competition endemic to
human society. Finally, at Wittenberg he seems reconciled to the dissolution of hierarchal
and confessional differences. These changes contribute to the (mis)diagnosis of a Nashe
problem discussed at the beginning of this chapter. But, taken en masse, they might also
reveal how satire need not work by simply insisting on clear distinctions. Rather, satire
plays with such distinctions, not necessarily with a view to reinforcing them through
egregious subversion, but to move beyond stasis and certainty into a domain of ambiguity
and contingency. The accumulation of Wilton’s observations throughout The Unfortunate
Traveller reflect Nashe’s own sense of professional and economic uncertainty, as
reflected in the dedication to Wriothesley; the possibility of a system of cultural and
economic valuation that is negotiable, as reflected in Wilton’s indication to his fellow
pages; and the capacity of early modern satire to accommodate the disparate, the
uncertain, and even the contradictory.
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